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Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and clinical depression are both internalizing 
disorders characterized by sustained negative affect and have mainly been studied utilizing either 
self-report or physiological measures. Fewer studies have focused on behavioral indices of these 
disorders, and little is known about their overlapping and distinct linguistic features. The present 
research examined the above gap in two separate studies. Study 1 synthesized previous efforts 
made to study the linguistic features of individuals with depression. Previous investigations 
found that depressed individuals evidence high proportions of I-words, high proportions of 
negatively-valenced words, low proportions of positively-valenced words, and high proportions 
of cognitive words.  However, these investigations had several limitations: they did not identify 
word categories that were specific to depression, they made relatively vague conceptual 
connections between language variables and their underlying psychological meaning, and they 
overly-relied on one software tool—the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and its 
predefined content-based word categories. Study 1 also offered a roadmap for more nuanced, 
theoretically based investigations of the linguistic characteristics of depressed individuals. Study 
2 utilized the conceptual and methodological insights from Study 1 to empirically examine the 
language of individuals with GAD, with or without comorbid depression (MDD and Dysthymic 
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Disorder) as they described peak autobiographical episodes: the happiest event of their lives, the 
saddest event in their lives, and the most anxiety-provoking situation they can imagine. Results 
showed that adults with comorbid GAD and depression used less specific language, but adults 
with GAD-only did not. Furthermore, while adults with comorbid Dysthymic Disorder 
(GAD+dys) were less specific across the entire interview, adults with comorbid MDD 
(GAD+MDD) were less specific only when describing happy memories. Second, adults with 
GAD+MDD were impaired in their ability to generate meaning from happy events. Adults with 
GAD+MDD also showed increased cognitive efforts at meaning-making, suggesting that they 
utilize ineffective verbal emotion regulation strategies. Finally, adults with GAD-only, as well as 
individuals with GAD+MDD, used language associated with less psychological distance than 
healthy controls. Taken together, these studies advance the knowledge of verbal behavior in 
adults with GAD and clinical depression and have the potential to inform both clinical practice 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Background 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD)—previously coined “the basic anxiety disorder” 
(Portman, Starcevic, & Beck, 2012, p. 82)—is marked by persistent anxiety, somatic tension, 
arousal and excessive worry (Portman, 2011). It is associated with significant economic burden: 
increased health care utilization as well as decreased work productivity (Wittchen, 2002). A 
characteristic behavior of adults with GAD, vaguely defined complaints when going to primary 
care physicians, makes it hard to diagnose. In the previous edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III), GAD suffered from low diagnostic reliability 
even among mental health professionals. Despite the improved specificity in the DSM-IV (APA, 
1994), which emphasized uncontrollable worry and physical symptoms related to heightened and 
chronic arousal (Aldao, Mennin, Linardatos, & Fresco, 2010a), distinguishing GAD from other 
disorders has remained challenging (Aldao et al., 2010a). The biggest challenge has been to 
disentangle GAD and depression; epidemiological studies suggest that two thirds of GAD 
patients retrospectively report an episode of major depression in their lifetime (Hofmann, Schulz, 
Heering, Muench, & Bufka, 2010).   
In spite of the high overlap between GAD and depression, some studies have shown that 
these disorders do indeed have distinct features. For example, Hofmann and colleagues (2010) 
found differences in heart rate variability, in an experimental setting, with adults with comorbid 
GAD and MDD evidencing more cardiac vagal tone (a measure that is considered an indicator of 
autonomic nervous system flexibility) than adults with GAD-only. In another study, Dupuy and 
Ladouceur (2008) found that adults with comorbid GAD and major depressive disorder (MDD) 
were less tolerant of uncertainty, were worse problem solvers and displayed more cognitive 
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avoidance than adults with GAD-only. Finally, Mennin and colleagues (2008) showed that 
heightened activation when experiencing emotions was related to GAD over and above MDD, 
and that poor understanding of emotions was related to MDD but not to GAD.  
Since GAD and depression are both internalizing disorders, they have mainly been 
studied utilizing either self-report or physiological measures. Self-report measures help 
understand the subjective experience (e.g., Aldao et al., 2010a; Dupuy & Ladouceur, 2008), 
while physiological measurements assess various bodily manifestations witnessed in the 
laboratory (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010). Fewer studies have focused on behavioral indices of 
individuals with these disorders, likely due to the difficulty detecting behavioral manifestations 
of these “distress disorders” (Mennin & Fresco, 2013b; Zbozinek et al., 2012). However, an 
enhanced understanding of the behavioral manifestations of these disorders may help elucidate 
the underlying cognitive processes which may be distinct (Klenk, Strauman, & Higgins, 2011), 
and possibly contribute to the symptomatic picture. The current dissertation focuses on one 
aspect of behavior in individuals with GAD and depression—the use of language. By studying 
the ways in which these individuals speak, it may be possible to better understand the ways in 
which they think, feel, tell stories and reflect on their own experiences (Pennebaker, 2011).   
II. Linguistic Analysis 
Individuals are not usually aware of the particulars of their language style, especially not 
in an ongoing manner (Bucci, Maskit, & Hoffman, 2012). Instead, they usually focus more on 
the content of their speech and on what they wish to communicate. However, the words they use 
have been shown to be indicative of both long-lasting personality traits (Pennebaker & King, 
1999) and changes in emotional states (e.g., Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004). In turn, looking 
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at word usage presents a unique opportunity to observe, in a fairly non-invasive way, a wide 
range of psychological phenomena (Pennebaker, 2011).  
The large-scale systematic study of word usage began in the last two decades, with the 
development of an automated text analysis software tool—the Liguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC; Pennebaker, Chung, & Ireland, 2007). The initial impetus for developing the LIWC was 
to see whether the words people use when writing about emotional topics predict later physical 
health. Until that point, Pennebaker and his colleagues relied on human judges to score the 
emotional essays; this created several problems: judges often disagreed about a wide range of 
dimensions; the process was slow and expensive; and judges tended to become depressed when 
reading depressive stories (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). 
Pennebaker and his colleagues originally meant to only calculate the percentage of 
positive and negative emotion words in a text (Pennebaker, 2011). However, once an automated 
tool became available, researchers began using it for multiple purposes, covering a wide range of 
psychological phenomena. To date, hundreds of studies have used computerized text analysis 
tools. Examples include comparisons of positive and negative political advertisements (Gunsch, 
Brownlow, Haynes, & Mabe, 2000; positive ads used more present and future tense verbs while 
negative ads used more past tense verbs), fiction writers and physicists (Djikic, Oatley, & 
Peterson, 2006; fiction writers used more emotion words, and especially negative emotion 
words), bloggers before and after 9/11 (Cohn et al., 2004; post 9/11 – a drop in “I” words and an 
increase in “we”), and more.   
This line of research helped identify relatively small word groups which appeared to have 
predictive power. They are referred to in the literature as function, or style words, 
interchangeably. While an average English speaking adult has a vocabulary of about 100,000 
4 
 
words (Pennebaker, 2011), they are not evenly distributed. Of the 100 million (British English) 
words in the British National Corpus (BNC), 26% of them are accounted for by the 10 most 
frequent words (Brier & Hopp, 2011). These words are: ‘the’, ‘be’, ‘of’, ‘and’, ‘to’, ‘a’, ‘in’, 
‘have’, ‘that’ and ‘it’. About 500 words are considered style (or function) words, and though they 
account for half a percent of the average vocabulary, they make up about 55% of spoken 
language (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Most function words are pronouns, prepositions, 
articles and auxiliary verbs and serve as “the cement that holds the content words together” 
(Chung & Pennebaker, 2007, p. 347). Because these function words occur so frequently, it is 
possible to detect word use differences between and within individuals (across time/conditions) 
by analyzing relatively short texts. As a thought experiment, consider how difficult it would be 
to detect how frequent someone you are talking to uses the relatively frequent content word 
‘know’ (frequency of 0.0014 in a Texas Instrument switchboard corpus; Bell, Brenier, Gregory, 
Girand, & Jurafsky, 2009). But noticing how often they use the word ‘I’ would not be as 
difficult.  
Having just made the case for the easier detection of function words due to their 
frequency, a caveat is in order. Unless conscious attention is focused on function words, they 
usually go unnoticed (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007). They are short (typically 1-4 letters); they 
are more predictable than content words (Bell et al., 2009); are in general processed faster than 
content words (Segalowitz & Lane, 2000); and are also processed somewhat differently in our 
brains (Diaz & McCarthy, 2009). Thus, automated tools are better suited for the task of 
identifying and comparing frequencies of function words. 
The focus on function words, along with the additional categorization of content words in 
the realms of, among other, emotion and cognition, helped advance the field of linguistic 
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analysis. Social, clinical, developmental and forensic psychologists utilized the LIWC and its 
categories to study word usage, both in written and spoken language. However, despite the large 
amount of empirical data gathered, “the psychological meaning of language use remains 
somewhat ambiguous” (Pennebaker & King, 1999, p. 1309).  
III. Linguistic Style and Depression  
Though the relationship between language use and clinical disorders has interested 
theorists and researchers for decades (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003), fairly little is 
known about this relationship. In the case of depression, early accounts broadly described 
depressed individuals’ language as “dull, stereotyped and blocked” (Bucci & Freedman, 1981, p. 
337). Beck (1967) noted that depressed individuals’ speech is brief, disfluent, and lacks 
spontaneity. Furthermore, he posited that they may be unable to express certain thoughts and 
feelings. In line with Beck’s (1967) theorizing, an early study by Bucci and Freedman tested the 
hypothesis that depressed individuals are impaired in their referential activity (RA; Bucci & 
Freedman, 1978)—the ability to translate inner experience into verbal form. Five elderly female 
inpatients with a diagnosis of MDD were asked to freely talk about any interesting personal 
experience for five minutes. Compared to speech samples of healthy controls, these depressed 
patients’ speech was characterized as “rambling, repetitious, and vague” (p. 348). Specifically, 
these patients used more first person pronouns than normal subjects and rarely used second 
person pronouns. Bucci and Freedman interpreted these findings as an indication of “weakness in 
reaching out to the listener or taking his point of view” (p. 350).  
Later empirical investigations, utilizing the LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2007), focused on 
depressed individuals’ tendency to turn their attention inwards (Pennebaker et al., 2003). This 
tendency was operationalized by the use of first person pronouns (i.e., I, me, my). Several 
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investigations found that depressed individuals used more first person pronouns than healthy 
controls (e.g., Rude, Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004; Stirman & Pennebaker, 2001).  Other 
investigations also found that depressed individuals used more negatively valenced words 
(Ramirez-Esparza, Chung, Kacewicz, & Pennebaker, 2008) and more cognitive words 
(Rodriguez, Holleran, & Mehl, 2010). However, these investigations were mainly exploratory 
and not theoretically-driven (Pennebaker et al., 2003). One of the goals of this dissertation was 
thus to advance the understanding of the relationship between depression and linguistic style by 
conducting an extensive—conceptual and empirical—review of the literature.  
IV. Linguistic Style and Anxiety  
One area where connections between linguistic style and underlying psychological 
phenomenon have been particularly hard to pinpoint is anxiety. As an indication, Pennebaker’s 
(2011) book, which covers the range of psychological topics studied via linguistic analysis, does 
not have the word “anxiety” in its index section. The reasons for this remain unclear, but one 
possibility is that one’s language may become more diffuse and less focused when he or she is 
anxious, and this is harder to identify using the standardized word dictionaries. Though 
speculative, this explanation is consistent with psycholinguistic studies of anxiety conducted in 
the 1960s, prior to the existence of text analysis software tools. Mahl (Kasl & Mahl, 1965; Mahl, 
1987; Zimbardo, Mahl, & Barnard, 1963), in a series of studies, found sentence changes, 
repetitions, omissions, sentence incompletions, tongue slips and intruding incoherent sounds to 
be associated with anxiety. For example, speech disturbances, not including “ah” were found to 
be strongly associated with a measure of palm sweat (Kasl & Mahl, 1965); and highly anxious 
children used more non- ah speech disturbances under evaluative conditions than non-anxious 
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children (Zimbardo et al., 1963). It is likely that the difficulty in identifying such speech 
disturbances, especially automatically, has led to the abandonment of these findings. 
A few sparse, more recent studies, utilized a factor-analytically derived variable termed 
Verbal Immediacy to study anxious individuals’ language, with the assumption that anxious 
individuals speak in a hyper-aroused, immediate way. Verbal Immediacy, which includes present 
tense verbs, first person pronouns, discrepancy words, short words (under 6 letters) and few 
articles, was hypothesized to reflect psychological hyperactivation and a lack of psychological 
distance (Lee, Sbarra, & Mason, 2011). The first study (Lee et al., 2011) included 119 adults 
from a community sample, who were recently separated from their romantic partner. The 
subjects’ stream of consciousness was recorded for 4 minutes; their blood pressure was then 
measured as they were asked to reflect on various mundane scenarios (a non-emotional task); 
finally, they were asked to reflect on themselves and their ex-partner in a variety of different 
situations (a heightened emotional task).  Results showed that participants who reported high 
attachment anxiety also scored high on Verbal Immediacy. Additionally, an interaction effect 
was found between attachment anxiety and verbal immediacy. Thus, individuals who were high 
on attachment anxiety and also scored high on Verbal Immediacy had increased blood pressure 
levels when thinking about divorce-specific material. In their discussion, the authors cautioned 
against equating anxiety with hyper-activation since not all anxious individuals become highly 
engaged/overinvolved.  
In another study that used Verbal Immediacy as a behavioral index for activation/anxiety, 
Borelli and colleagues (2011) administered the Child Attachment Interview (CAI; Target, 
Fonagy, & Shmueli-Goetz, 2003) to 93 children between the ages of 8 and 12. The interviews 
were then coded to assess the child’s state of mind with respect to attachment figures, and each 
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interview was given a score of attachment security. Each child was then classified into one of 
four attachment categories with respect to each caregiver: secure, dismissing, preoccupied, or 
disorganized. The interviews were also analyzed using LIWC to derive Verbal Immediacy 
scores.  These authors found that children who were classified as preoccupied scored higher on 
Verbal Immediacy than all other attachment categories.  Children classified as dismissing scored 
lower on Verbal Immediacy than securely attached children. Additionally, the study showed that 
children classified as disorganized had lower Verbal Immediacy scores when discussing loss.  
Several limitations should be noted with regards to the psycholinguistic study of anxiety. 
First, the small number of studies studying connections between linguistic style and anxiety 
(Borelli et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2011) focused on attachment anxiety. While attachment anxiety 
and trait anxiety have been found to be correlated (e.g., Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, Wendelken, & 
Mikulincer, 2005), they do not denote the same psychological process. Attachment anxious 
individuals become emotionally activated when thinking about losses, breakups or other 
separations, while individuals with trait anxiety, as seen for example in GAD, are likely to make 
threatening interpretations of ambiguous stimuli, regardless of its source (Walsh, Balint, Smolira, 
Fredericksen, & Madsen, 2009). Consequently, it may be easier to detect hyperactivation in the 
language of individuals with high attachment anxiety because the context under which they 
become activated is better defined.  
V. Overview of Dissertation Studies 
The goal of this dissertation was to examine linguistic style in individuals with GAD and 
depressive disorders, in an effort to identify linguistic features related to anxiety and depression. 
Two studies were constructed to achieve this goal. Study 1 aimed to synthesize the efforts to 
delineate the ways in which individuals with depression speak. This qualitative review of the 
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literature had several secondary aims: (1) to identify—and organize—the aspects of depression 
that have been studied linguistically. (2) to review the methods used to study depression. (3) to 
delineate conceptual and methodological limitations in the literature. And (4) to offer guidelines 
for future studies. Using the insights learned from Study 1, Study 2 aimed to empirically study—
using linguistic text analysis—the ways in which individuals with GAD, with or without 
comorbid depression speak. More specifically, this study focused on the ways in which they 




Chapter 2: Study 1 – A Roadmap to the Psycholinguistic Study of Depression. More than 
Meets the ‘I’ 
Despite being recognized as a devastating disorder (e.g., Sapolsky, 2001), depression is 
often still stigmatized, hidden, and unrecognized (Jarrold, Javitz, Krasnow, Peintner, Yeh, Swan, 
& Mehl, 2011).  Several factors contribute to the disorder’s relatively poor detectability.  First, 
depression is highly private, with most of its features having to do with negative thoughts or 
feelings, and only few external, behavioral manifestations (Rodriguez et al., 2010).  Second, 
depressed individuals do not necessarily seek help, and when they do, it is often from non-mental 
health professionals (Diala, Muntaner, Walrath, Nickerson, LaVeist, & Leaf, 2001).  Third, peers 
of depressed individuals are often the ones who make the initial assessment of level of 
depression; their judgments—especially in the case of mild or moderate depressive symptoms—
are often inaccurate (Mehl, 2006).  Finally, when clinicians and researchers evaluate 
psychopathology, they frequently rely on the individual’s subjective reports (Balsters, Krahmer, 
Swerts, & Vingerhoets, 2010), with the two most common methods of assessing depression 
being self-report measures (e.g., the Beck Depression Inventory; BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and clinical interviews (e.g., the Structured Clinical interview for DSM 
Disorders; SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002).  Psychologists have thus been 
searching for objective methods to detect depression that are not as reliant on professional 
assessment or on individuals’ honest and accurate self-report (e.g., Rodriguez et al., 2010).   
This study synthesizes—and aims to further—the efforts made to study the verbal 
behavior of depressed individuals.  By closely looking at frequency of word use, it is possible to 
detect personality traits as well as situational mental states (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007; Spence, 
Scarborough, & Ginsberg, 1978).  Pennebaker (2011) has asserted that words are like 
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“fingerprints,” highlighting the relatively consistent ways in which an individual utilizes 
language in a context-independent manner (see also Pennebaker & King, 1999).  Other 
investigations have demonstrated the sensitivity of language in detecting differences in 
emotional states (e.g., Cohn et al., 2004) and that language use can change following successful 
psychological treatment (e.g., Lane & Viney, 2005).    
The first section of the study will provide a review of the existing literature on the 
psycholinguistic studies of depressed individuals.  In the second section, both conceptual and 
methodological limitations in the literature will be discussed.  The third section will describe an 
advanced text-analysis tool and three word category types that can be used to expand the scope 
of these investigations.  Finally, a roadmap for future psycholinguistic studies of depression will 
be delineated.   
Psycholinguistic Studies of Depression: an Overview 
A number of studies have begun looking at word use of depressed individuals.  These 
studies have by and large used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker et al., 
2007)—a text analysis software which goes through a series of text files (e.g., interviews, poems, 
blogs, etc.), word by word, and checks to see whether or not the word is part of one of its 
categories.  When it is done processing the text files, it produces an output file with the 
frequencies of each LIWC dictionary.  For example, when analyzing the line “It was a dark 
stormy night” (example from: Pennebaker et al., 2007), it will first come across the word “it”.  
After comparing it to the different dictionaries it will aggregate the function word, pronoun, and 
personal pronoun categories.   
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In what follows, a review of the body of literature studying verbal behavior in depressed 
individuals is provided (see also Table 1).  Of note, none of the studies reported used clinical 
interviews to determine depression status.  Additionally, there is no one clear definition of 
depression used in all the studies.  The review is organized according to the main hypotheses that 
have to date been proposed and studied.  While these hypotheses bear some resemblance to the 
ones proposed in the suggested roadmap for future studies, they are not identical. 
The Self-Focus Hypothesis  
Referencing Pyszczynski and Greenberg’s (1987) Self-Awareness Theory of Reactive 
Depression, researchers hypothesized that depressed individuals’ attention is focused inwards 
and that in turn their language would evidence high rates of first person pronouns (e.g., I, me, 
my).  In one study (Rude et al., 2004) depressed, formerly-depressed and never-depressed 
college aged students were asked to write for 20 minutes about their deepest thoughts and 
feelings about being in college.  The essays were then compared using the LIWC (Pennebaker et 
al., 2007).  Results showed that the currently depressed group used more first person singular 
pronouns than the never-depressed group.  A post hoc analysis revealed that the only statistically 
meaningful difference was in the use of “I” (Rude et al., 2004). 
Another study, literary in nature, examined linguistic differences between suicidal and 
non-suicidal poets (Stirman & Pennebaker, 2001).  Poems from early, middle, and late periods of 
suicidal poets (e.g., Sylvia Plath, Vladimir Mayakovsky) and matched control non-suicidal poets 
(e.g., Denise Levertov, Osip Mandelstam) were selected; next, the following LIWC categories 
were compared: pronouns, communication words (e.g. talk, share), negative emotion words, 
positive emotion words and death words (e.g. dead, grave).  Results showed that suicidal poets 
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used more I-words than controls.  In this case, the authors did not elaborate on differences 
between “I”, “me” and “my”. 
In a study that failed to demonstrate higher use of “I-words”, Rodriguez and colleagues 
(2010) asked undergraduate participants to write about themselves as they would in either a 
personal diary or an online blog.  Higher depression scores, as evidenced by the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961), were not significantly correlated with use of “I-words”.  The 
authors offer a possible explanation for this inconsistency with prior research: that the instruction 
already emphasized writing about oneself, therefore making it harder to identify between-subject 
differences in this variable. 
Finally, a study by Jarrold et al. (2011) may help shed some light on the more specific 
connection of I-words and depression.  The researchers, which specifically targeted the 
association between I-words and depression, found that depressed individuals were more likely 
to use I-words when answering the following question: “In your work or career, have you 
accomplished most of the things that you wanted to accomplish? (If not) why not? What’s gotten 
in the way? Are you doing anything about this?” (p. 693).  In fact, the I-word differences 
between depressed and non-depressed individuals were not statistically significant when 
comparing the entire interview.  Thus, it may be the case that depressed individuals use I-words 
more when they ruminate (for a review on rumination, see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008) about the sources of their problems.  
Prevalence of Negative Affect  
Since depression is characterized by negative affect, several studies have tested the 
hypothesis that depressed individuals’ language—in comparison to non-depressed individuals—
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evidences higher rates of negative emotion words (signaling negative affect) and low rates of 
positive emotion words (signaling a lack of positive affect).  Rude et al. (2004) reported that the 
currently depressed group used far more negatively-valenced words (e.g., sad, homesick, 
inadequate) than the formerly depressed and non-depressed groups.  No differences were 
reported, however, in their use of positive words.  In the study conducted by Rodriguez et al. 
(2010), sadness words (e.g., sad, cry) were strongly correlated with depression in a personal 
diary condition, but not in an online blog condition.  Conversely, swear words (e.g., damn) were 
strongly associated with depression in the online blog, but not in the personal diary condition.  In 
this study, positive words were negatively associated with depression in both conditions.  
An additional study (Ramirez-Esparza et al., 2008) compared posts in online depression 
forums with posts from breast cancer forums. They found differences in emotion words, positive 
and negative, between the groups, both in English and in Spanish.  The posts on the depression 
forums had more negative emotion words and fewer positive emotion words than the posts on 
the breast cancer forums.  In a study that failed to replicate this finding, Mehl (2006) used an 
electronic recorder and randomly sampled sound clips over two days in the lives of 
undergraduate students.  These sound clips were later transcribed and analyzed using the LIWC. 
Results did not show any statistically significant correlation between emotion word use, positive 
or negative, and the students’ scores on the short form of the BDI (BDI–SF; Beck & Beck, 
1972).  
High Rates of Cognitive Words 
Several studies implicitly hypothesized (i.e., without clear justification) that depressed 
individuals would use higher rates of cognitive words.  For example, Rodriguez and colleagues 
(2010) reported that depressed individuals used more cognitive mechanism words (e.g., know, 
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cause), more causation words (e.g., because, why), more insight words (e.g., think, realize) and 
more inhibition words (e.g., avoid, forbid).  These differences only applied, however, to self-
descriptions in personal diaries.  None of these cognitive word groups remained significantly 
different in online blog self-descriptions.  
A sub-category of cognitive words—causation words—was found to be positively 
correlated with depression scores in the Mehl (2006) study described above.  Increased cognitive 
word use has also been found in studies of rumination, which is strongly associated with 
depression (Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012; Grisham, Flower, Williams, & Moulds, 2011).  
For example, one study instructed undergraduate students to ruminate by thinking about a 
negative event, focusing on it from their own perspective, turning it over and over in their mind, 
and focusing on the reasons for their feelings and responses (Grisham et al., 2011).  Results 
showed that participants in the rumination condition used significantly more cognitive words 
than participants in the reappraisal condition who were instructed to think about an event from 
the perspective of an impartial observer.   
In a study that failed to demonstrate a correlation between high rates of cognitive word 
use and depression, Vanheule and colleagues (2009) analyzed semi-structured interviews with 32 
Dutch mental health outpatients.  In this study, no significant correlations were reported between 
LIWC categories and any of the BDI-II subscales. 
Limitations in the Psycholinguistic Study of Depression 
 One limitation of previous studies is that they have not identified markers that are 
specific to depression, thereby limiting discriminant validity.  For example, differences in first 
person pronoun use are connected to a wide range of other phenomena: women use more I-words 
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than men (Newman, Groom, Handelman, & Pennebaker, 2008); low-status people use more I-
words than high-status people (Sexton & Helmreich, 2000); truth-tellers use more I-words than 
liars (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003); and, anecdotally, Harry Truman used far 
more I-words than Barack Obama (Pennebaker, 2011).  The following quote from Pennebaker 
(2011) highlights the multiple interpretations that can be made based on I-words: 
“Depending on the context, using I-words at high rates may signal insecurity, honesty, 
and depression proneness but also that you aren’t planning on declaring war any time in 
the near future.  Using I-words at low rates, on the other hand, may get you into college 
and boost your grade-point average but may hurt your chances of making close friends” 
(p. 289) 
A second limitation of previous studies is that the connections between the different 
linguistic markers and their conceptual meaning were left vague.  For example, one study (Mehl, 
2006) reported in its method section that it only used linguistic categories “with strong 
theoretical connections to depression” (p. 341) but did not explain what those strong theoretical 
connections were.  Another study (Vanheule, Desmet, & Meganck, 2009) reported using 
linguistic categories such as “affective or emotional processes” or “cognitive processes” (p. 476) 
but again did not explain why and how these word categories were related to their respective 
psychological constructs.  A third study (Ramirez-Esparza et al., 2008), which reported 
differences in positive and negative emotion words, did not provide any theoretical explanation 
for why these words might be indicative of positive or negative affect, though it is implied.  
A third limitation of these studies is their over-reliance on the LIWC.  Some of the 
LIWC’s characteristics may hinder more nuanced investigations of the linguistic markers of 
depression.  For example, it uses a probabilistic algorithm and is insensitive to context.  Thus it 
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cannot distinguish between the word “mad” as in “I’m mad about you” and “you make me mad”.  
Additionally, the LIWC can only produce output variables for an entire text segment.  This limits 
the ability to track the ebb-and-flow of language across time.  There is also no way to determine, 
in its current version, when in a text (usually more applicable to spoken language) one was 
struggling, anxious, “searching for words”, or elated.  These are all capacities that seasoned 
clinicians and sensitive, psychologically minded, individuals have long been able to detect.  The 
inability to track the ebb-and-flow of language also precludes the possibility of correlating 
linguistic variables with other physiological variables such as acoustic measures, facial 
expressions or other, more invasive measures of central or peripheral nervous system activation. 
Finally, these studies relied on the predefined, content-based, dictionaries of the LIWC.  
As a hypothetical example, in order for the word ‘apple’ to be included in the ‘fruit’ dictionary, 
experts have to agree that it is, indeed, a fruit.  While content validity is obviously high for these 
dictionaries (inclusion was based on judges’ agreement about content), their construct validity is 
less certain.  Take the affect dictionaries for example.  In a study that assessed individuals’ 
emotional experience via self-report measures, Bantum and Owen (2009) found that none of the 
affect dictionaries (positive emotions, positive feelings, optimism, negative emotions, anxiety, 
anger, or sadness) were correlated with the individuals’ self-reported positive or negative 
feelings.  In a different study, Kahn and colleagues (2007) reported significant correlations 
between individuals’ state-level feelings and LIWC affect dictionaries.  However, this was done 
by analyzing participants’ responses to a prompt to explicitly discuss their feelings, or by 
analyzing texts where they were asked to discuss sad or amusing memories.  Thus, this adds little 
support to the notion that currently used affect dictionaries can tap into underlying emotional 
states more than self-report questionnaires can. 
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Expanding the Scope of Psycholinguistic Investigations 
The psycholinguistic study of depression has been limited, among other reasons, by 
methodological hurdles (Cohen, 2012).  While there may be various ways to overcome these 
hurdles, in this section I describe an advanced software tool and various dictionary types that can 
be used in future studies.  
The Discourse Attributes Analysis Program (DAAP) 
The DAAP (Maskit, 2014a, 2014b) shares many of the characteristics of the LIWC 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007): It reads texts of either spoken or written language, checks each word 
to see if it belongs to one of its word categories/ dictionaries and produces a final output which 
states what percentage of a text consisted of each word category.  It has, however, a few distinct, 
more sophisticated, features: (a) It can track multiple speakers if these are indicated in the text; 
(b) it can utilize weighted dictionaries.  For each word in a weighted dictionary, the software 
assigns a value.  To illustrate, a weighted dictionary may assign a higher “uniqueness” value for 
the word “extraordinary” than for the word “different”.  The output will indicate a weighted 
average of all the words in the category; (c) it utilizes a smoothing function which computes a 
linguistic score for each dictionary at each point in the text.  More emphasis is given to the 
current word and less emphasis to the words that came before it or after it.  Thus, for example, to 
calculate a “smoothed” score for word number 2400, it will average all the words from 2300-
2500, while emphasizing (giving stronger weights to) the words closer to word number 2400 
(example from Maskit & Murphy, 2012); (d) it calculates covariations between pairs of 
measures.  The smoothing function allows for the calculation of the tendency for different 
linguistic or other variables to move together or in opposite directions; and (e) it incorporates the 
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freeware acoustic analysis software tool PRAAT (Boersma & Weenink, 2014), thus allowing for 
the calculation of acoustic variables as well as their covariance with linguistic measures.  
The DAAP has been used to study psychotherapy process (Bucci & Maskit, 2007; Bucci 
et al., 2012; Hoffman, Algus, Braun, Bucci, & Maskit, 2013; Mariani, Maskit, Bucci, & De 
Coro, 2013), to validate the measures of Bucci’s (1997) referential process (Kingsley, 2009), to 
assess narration and vividness in autobiographical memories (Nelson, Moskovitz,, & Steiner, 
2008), and to assess episodic memory (Maskit & Bucci, 2012).  The software has, however, 
several limitations.  First, it has been used less frequently by researchers.  Second, though the 
DAAP developers aim to make it open-source and available for free online (Maskit, personal 
communication), there is no current downloadable version, and in order to use the software, one 
needs to, at least initially, collaborate with Bucci and Maskit’s research group 
(www.thereferentialprocess.org).  Third, it supports only English and Italian, thereby limiting 
cross-cultural studies. 
Word Categories/Dictionaries Relevant to the Study of Depression 
As mentioned, research efforts to study the linguistic characteristics of depressed 
individuals have mainly relied on the predefined (content-based) dictionaries of the LIWC 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007).   Aside from content-based dictionaries, researchers have also utilized 
inductively–generated dictionaries and weighted dictionaries based on existing, empirically-
validated word lists.   
Inductively derived dictionaries use texts rated by human judges for theoretical constructs 
(e.g., cognitive rigidity; Cohen, 2012) to generate a list of words that co-occur with language that 
is high on the specific construct.  One such example, relevant to the study of depression, is the 
Weighted Referential Activity Dictionary (WRAD; Bucci & Maskit, 2006) which assesses 
20 
 
language that is specific, clear, concrete and imagistic.  Since it has been shown that depressed 
individuals, when talking about autobiographical memories, use vague and overgeneral 
descriptions (e.g., Williams et al., 2007), the WRAD may be useful in identifying such 
overgeneralized language.   
The Weighted Referential Activity Dictionary (WRAD; Bucci & Maskit, 2006).  Referential 
Activity (RA) denotes the capacity to express subsymbolic material in words.  Language high in 
RA uses concrete and specific imagery; it captures an immediate quality; and is likely to evoke 
vivid, specific and immediate experience in the listener.  To construct the WRAD, four distinct 
sets of spoken language, consisting of 763 texts, were used, after they had been manually scored 
for RA by at least two raters.  These texts were then divided into 6 categories ranging from very 
low (0-2.75) to very high RA (7.25-10).  Finally, a weight between -1 and 1 was assigned to each 
word, based on its proportional distribution (a detailed description of the weighting procedure is 
available in Bucci & Maskit, 2006).  This helped exclude words with a bi-modal distribution 
such as “but”.  It also helped differentiate between words that contribute differentially to RA.  
For example, though both “a” and “the” are articles, they do not have the same weight (0.625 and 
1 respectively).  Talking about “a tree” is less specific or connected to inner experience than 
talking about “the big oak tree in my grandfather’s back yard”.  As expected, the pronouns “it” 
and “that” receive negative weights, as they refer to non-specific items. Table 2 shows the first 
20 rows in the WRAD matrix. 
Weighted dictionaries may also be derived by using empirically-validated word lists and 
assigning appropriate weights.  One example of such a dictionary is a weighted affect dictionary 
(Murphy, 2014) based on the ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 1999). Since depression is first and 
foremost a disorder of mood, a refined affect dictionary may help detect shifts in emotionality. 
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A Weighted Affect Dictionary (Murphy, 2014).  The Weighted Affect Dictionary (WAD; 
Murphy, 2014) is based on the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 
1999)—a set of 1,034 English words which includes verbs, nouns and adjectives.  Each word in 
the ANEW was assigned three scores from 1-9 on arousal, pleasure and dominance based on an 
average of raters’ scores using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1999).  For example, the word “bored” was assigned a low arousal (2.83), and a negative valence 
(low pleasure) score (2.95) while the word “frustrated” was assigned a relatively high arousal 
score (5.55) and a negative valence score (2.70).  The ANEW has been used in a wide range of 
studies.  For example, an fMRI study using words from the ANEW as a prompt (Lewis, 
Critchley, Rotshtein, & Dolan, 2007) showed that specific regions of the brain were involved in 
the processing of valence while other regions were involved in the processing of arousal. The 
WAD (Murphy, 2014) transforms the ANEW scores into weights compatible with the DAAP. 
High scores on the arousal scale denote high arousal and high scores on valence denote words 
that are associated with pleasurable feelings.  This dictionary has yet to be used in text analytic 
studies presumably because of software limitation which precluded the use of weighted 
dictionaries but nonetheless holds promise for the improvement of detectability of affect in text 
analysis. 
A Roadmap for Future Studies 
In this final section, several strategies for more nuanced detection of linguistic markers in 
the language of depressed individuals will be detailed.  These strategies make use of the DAAP 
(or similar software products that will be available in the future) and the dictionaries described in 
the previous section of the paper.  I begin with a strategy for detecting Emotion Context-
Insensitivity (ECI; Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005). 
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Strategy 1: Detecting Emotion Context-Insensitivity 
  Depression is characterized by deficient positive affect, excessive negative affect, or 
both (Rottenberg et al., 2005a).  With the growing interest in emotion regulation, researchers 
have sought to understand if and how depression alters emotion reactivity.  Rottenberg and 
colleagues (2005a) compared between three competing hypotheses: (a) the positive attenuation 
hypothesis which states that depressed individuals will exhibit little emotional reactivity to 
positive stimuli (e.g., not laugh at a joke); (b) the negative potentiation hypothesis which states 
that depressed individuals will evidence stronger negative reactions to negative emotional stimuli 
(e.g., feel acute sadness in response to a sad movie); and (c) the ECI hypothesis which states that 
depressed individuals exhibit reduced positive affect in response to positive stimuli but also 
reduced emotional reactivity in response to negative stimuli.  Stated differently, according to this 
hypothesis depressed individuals are less engaged and reactive to stimuli regardless of valence.  
Rottenberg et al. (2005) concluded that the ECI hypothesis received the most empirical support.  
For example, unlike healthy controls, depressed individuals reported similar levels of sadness in 
response to happy, sad and neutral films.  Depressed individuals also reported lower levels of 
happiness in response to the various emotional stimuli.  The authors did not, however, find 
support for the ECI hypothesis in their physiological measurement (heart rate, finger pulse, 
respiration rate and skin conductance rate).  Further support for the ECI model was reported by 
Bylsma and colleagues (2008) who conducted a meta-analysis to determine the best fitting model 
of emotional reactivity in depression.  
Linguistically, we can hypothesize that depressed individuals will use more negatively-
valenced words than their non-depressed counterparts and this can be detected using the 
weighted affect dictionary. However, since deficits in positive affect are not specific to 
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depression (e.g., Larson, Nitschke, & Davidson, 2007), other aspects of the ECI model should 
also be explored. 
 The main emotional reactivity theme delineated by the ECI model is that depressed 
individuals are less behaviorally reactive to emotional stimulus, regardless of its valence 
(Rottenberg & Vaughan, 2008).  The “flatness” in their emotional reactions may be a source of 
interpersonal difficulties, as they can be “hard to read” and illicit negative emotional reactions 
and even elevated blood pressure in their conversational partners (Butler, Egloff, Wlhelm, Smith, 
Erickson, & Gross, 2003).  Linguistically, we can hypothesize that the arousal level of depressed 
individuals’ language—as measured with arousal dimension of the WAD—will be less variable 
than healthy controls.  
 Finally, the ECI model contradicts the Negative Potentiation Hypothesis (Lewinsohn, 
Lobitz, & Wilson, 1973) which states that depressed individuals with display strong negative 
emotions in response to negative stimuli.  The covariation between the arousal and valence 
dimensions of the WAD can help test these competing hypotheses.  If the negative potentiation 
hypothesis is correct, we could expect a negative covariation—arousal level goes up for negative 
affect and goes down for positive affect.  Conversely, if the ECI model holds, we can expect a 
non-significant covariation—arousal is expected to be low regardless of valence. 
Strategy 2: Detecting Reduced Autobiographical Memory Specificity (AMS) 
Though finding specific trait-level characteristics of depression that can be detected 
linguistically is difficult, the reduced capacity to report specific autobiographical memories may 
qualify as one (Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006).  Repeatedly, studies have found that 
depressed individuals, when asked to describe memories, tend to use overgeneral, nonspecific 
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language to describe personal memories (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).  For example, Birch and 
Davidson (2007) compared 17 depressed participants with matched healthy controls on the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Robinson, 1976), which categorizes participants’ 
memories (in response to word cues) as categorical, extended, or specific.  The depressed group 
produced significantly less detailed memories, but the groups did not differ on categorical 
memories.  Overall, Williams et al. (2007) found a large mean effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.94) for 
overgeneral memory in depression across 28 studies.  Very few studies failed to replicate 
overgeneral memory in depressed individuals (Williams et al., 2007).  Additionally, 
autobiographical memory specificity (AMS)1  has not been shown to be impaired in individuals 
diagnosed with only anxiety disorders (Williams et al., 2007).  Since depression is often 
comorbid with anxiety disorders, deficits in AMS can be seen as a relatively specific 
characteristic of depression. 
One explanation for the reduced AMS in depressive disorders has been termed the affect 
regulation hypothesis (Williams, Stiles, & Shapiro, 1999).  It suggests that individuals ward off 
painful experiences by retrieving generic, nonspecific memories.  While these memories might 
still be painful, they evoke secondary emotions which are preferable to the primary emotions 
evoked by a specific memory.  Williams et al. (1999) illustrate this with an example:  
The general memory ‘I’ve always been poor at maintaining relationships’ may evoke 
secondary emotion that is painful but may nevertheless be preferable to the primary 
emotion associated with remembering the particular event of your partner telling you he 
or she had found someone else. (p. 301). 
                                                          
1 Some studies examine overgeneral memory (OGM) and some studies examine autobiographic memory specificity 
(AMS). These are two ways of examining the same phenomenon.  
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Most studies aimed at assessing AMS utilized the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; 
Robinson, 1976), which uses cue words to elicit memories specific in time and place.  A 
categorical response to a cue word would include a class of events (e.g., “going to work”) or an 
extended period (e.g., “my first year in grad school”); conversely, a specific response would 
mention a unique occurrence that did not last more than 24 hours (e.g., “The Millennium party at 
my dorm room at Oberlin College”).  Other ways of measuring autobiographical memory include 
structured interviews such as the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopelman, Wilson, 
& Baddeley, 1989) and the Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & 
Moscovitch, 2002).  The first scores memories for richness and specificity on a 0-3 scale, while 
the second classifies each detail of a memory as either internal (i.e., episodic) or external (i.e., 
non-episodic), and then sums them to form internal and external composites.  Piolino and 
colleagues (2009) have also introduced an AM task—the TEMPau task—which focuses on the 
ability to subjectively “travel back into the past and relive specific details of that event” (p.  
2315). 
Referential Activity (RA; Bucci, 1997) assesses language for specificity, concreteness, 
clarity and imagery.  Thus, there is at least conceptual overlap between RA and specificity of 
episodic memory.  There appear to be an even larger overlap between the more recent 
conceptualizations of autobiographical memory (Levine et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2009) and 
RA.  Both draw on William James’ (1890/2010) notion of personal memory that has “warmth 
and intimacy”.  A recent study was designed to determine if and which measures of RA would 
provide the best fit for autobiographical memory assessment.  Maskit and Bucci (2012) used 
transcribed and scored interviews from Addis and colleague’s (2008) study for this purpose.  In 
the original study, participants were given an adapted form of the Autobiographical Interview 
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(Levine et al., 2002) and these interviews were subsequently scored according to the AI scoring 
procedures.  The same transcribed interviews were analyzed using the DAAP.  Results showed 
that WRAD scores were highly correlated (r = 0.582, p<0.001) with Levine et al.’s (2002) 
proportion of internal details.  Thus, the WRAD may provide a sufficiently powerful linguistic 
marker for AMS. 
Strategy 3: Detecting Rumination 
Rumination is defined as “a mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively and 
passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the possible causes and consequences of these 
symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008, p. 400).  It is considered a cognitive or verbal activity 
(Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002) which provides a temporary escape or relief 
from physiological arousal but at the expense of poor emotional processing (Armey et al., 2009).  
Though it is considered a form of self-reflection, it has been conceptualized as perseverative and 
ineffective (Grisham et al., 2011).  It inhibits adaptive problem solving, reduces motivation and 
initiative, and interferes with social support (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  Overall, ruminative 
content appears to be highly negative (Fresco et al., 2002), focused on past personal loss or 
failure (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), and on the reasons for the depressive symptoms (Smith & 
Alloy, 2009).  Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) argue that it is not merely the content of 
rumination that is related to psychopathology, but also the “nature, flexibility, and beliefs about 
thinking” (p. 7).   
Aldao and colleagues (2010b), in a meta-analytic review of the relationships between 
various emotion regulation strategies and psychopathology, found rumination to have the largest 
effect on psychopathology.  They concluded that rumination was associated with anxiety, 
depression, eating and substance-related disorders.  However, the largest association was found 
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with depression.  Similarly, Mor and Winquist (2002) found rumination to be the form of self-
focus most strongly and consistently related to depressive symptoms.  Engagement in rumination 
has been associated with the onset of major depression (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), as well as the duration of depressive symptoms in several 
studies (e.g., Hong, 2007; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Robinson & 
Alloy, 2003). The tendency to ruminate has been found to be relatively stable even after 
depressive symptoms subside (Just & Alloy, 1997). 
The most commonly used measure of rumination is the Response Styles Questionnaire 
(RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  The 71-item self-report measure is used to identify 
coping strategies utilized in response to depressed mood.  Among the items are the following:  
“try to understand yourself by focusing on your depressed feelings” and “think about all your 
shortcomings, failures, faults, mistakes”.  Since rumination is considered a verbal strategy, 
several studies have begun to examine which word categories tend to accompany rumination. 
Overall, these studies found that subjects who ruminate use more causal words (Denson et al., 
2012; Grisham et al., 2011; Santa Maria, Reichert, Hummel, & Ehring, 2012; Watkins, 2004), 
more negative emotion words (Denson et al., 2012), more I-words (Grisham et al., 2011), and 
more past tense verbs (Denson et al., 2012; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004).  These results shed 
some light on the linguistic characteristics of rumination.  The high use of cognitive words 
highlights an overemphasis on meaning-making; on attempts to find reasons for one’s emotional 
situation.  Furthermore, it is negatively valenced, focused on the past, and on the self.   
All of the above studies were conducted using an experimental paradigm which prompted 
individuals to ruminate.  For example, in one study individuals were asked to think about a 
negative event, focus on it from their own perspective, turn it over and over in their mind, and 
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focus on the reasons for their feelings and responses (Grisham et al., 2011).  In another, they 
were instructed to write about their judgments of their emotional responses to a stressful situation 
(Low, Stanton, & Bower, 2008).  Thus, since individuals—even when depressed—do not 
constantly engage in rumination, it is unlikely that such significant results could be found 
without an experimental induction. 
In order to detect rumination linguistically without an experimental induction, a first step 
would entail generating a Weighted Rumination Dictionary (WRD) using the procedure outlined 
by Bucci & Maskit (2006).  The construction and validation datasets can consist of 
experimentally induced rumination texts (e.g., Grisham et al., 2011).  Once such a dictionary 
exists, we can calculate a HRP (High Rumination Proportion) variable.  Similar to the HWP, it 
will calculate the proportion of a text that the speaker spent using language that was high on 
rumination.  This strategy has the potential to increase the ecological validity of rumination 
detection as it does not require a specific prompt and can make use of a wide range of texts.  
Limitations 
Several limitations of the proposed roadmap should be noted.  First, clearly the above 
strategies should be seen as speculative until they receive due empirical support.  Second, the 
strategy for detecting the ECI model utilizes a dimensional theory of affect (Russell, 1980), 
which does not account for the role of discrete emotions.  Further research is needed to 
determine if a discrete emotions approach (e.g., Gruber, Oveis, Keltner, & Johnson, 2011) is 
missing in order to better detect depression linguistically.  Third, the strategy offered for 
detecting rumination is limited in the identification of a main feature of rumination—its 
repetitive nature (Smith & Alloy, 2009).  For this to be possible, future versions of text analysis 
software tools need to compare words or phrases not only to external dictionaries, but also to 
29 
 
words or phrases used in previous parts of a text.  Another challenge exists in the creation of a 
weighted rumination dictionary—researchers need to agree on the definition of rumination, or at 
least on which texts are high in ruminative content. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The analysis of written and spoken texts holds much promise for the possible detection of 
depression.  Psycholinguistic studies of depressed individuals have shown that—compared to 
non-depressed controls—they use high rates of I-words, high rates of negatively valenced words, 
low rates of positively valenced words and high rates of cognitive words.  To advance the 
knowledge of the unique linguistic markers of depression, three strategies were proposed, 
drawing on recent theoretical and empirical literature on depression, and on technological 
advances in psycholinguistics.  Notably, these strategies use several advanced features in the 
DAAP—weighted dictionaries, the calculation of variability, and co-variance between different 
linguistic variables. 
The first strategy was aimed at detecting common emotional reactivity themes in 
depression.  Based on the ECI model, depressed individuals are known to have little variability 
in their emotional responses, and to consistently report negative affect.  Using the arousal and 
valence dimensions of the weighted affect dictionary (Murphy, 2014) the following hypotheses 
were stated: (a) depressed individuals would have low valence scores; (b) depressed individuals 
would have low variability scores on both arousal and valence; (c) the covariance between the 
arousal and valence would be non-significant. The second strategy aimed to detect reduced 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity (AMS)—a cognitive feature shown to be strongly 
associated with depression.  Using the WRAD, the following hypothesis was stated: depressed 
individuals would evidence lower WRAD scores than their non-depressed counterparts.  The 
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third strategy aimed to identify rumination by creating an empirically modeled Weighted 
Rumination Dictionary.  Using the High Rumination Proportion (HRP) variable, it was 
hypothesized that depressed individuals would evidence higher HRP than non-depressed even in 
texts generated without the intention of identifying rumination.   
Future studies are needed to determine if and which of these strategies can indeed be 
reliable indicators of depression.  Additionally, it is clear that there are large variations in 
language based on the context (Biber, 1988).  Thus, in order to determine which strategies best 
detect depression, it will also be necessary to determine which contexts are best suited for such 
automated procedures.  Despite the above limitations, the previously described psycholinguistic 
strategies have several strengths.  They utilize empirically studied theoretical models of 
depression or related cognitive-emotional characteristics; they make use of relatively 
sophisticated text analysis tools; and they provide preliminary suggestions for integrating theory 
with empirical methodology.  Hopefully, they will prove useful in improving the detectability 
and understanding of depressive disorders. 
In the next chapter of this dissertation, an empirical study is presented. Study 2 builds on 
the above recommendations and utilizes automated text analysis using both the LIWC 
(Pennebaker et al., 2007) and the DAAP (Maskit, 2014a, 2014b) to closely examine the ways in 
which adults with GAD, with or without comorbid depression, talk about peak autobiographical 
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1. Correlation between 
depression severity and self-
focused words: r=0.42, p = 0.04 
2. Group differences significant 
only  for Q24-B, p=0.003, eta 
square=.36 

















1st person singular words were 
correlated with severity of 
depression symptoms (r=0.2, 
p<0.05 for entire sample, r=0.8, 
p<0.001 for highly depressed 
individuals) 
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No significant findings 1. Positive emotion 
words: 




2. Sadness words 
Personal Diary: 
r=.60(p<.001) 
Online Blog: NS 
3. Swear words 
Personal Diary: NS 
Online Blog: 










Online Blog: NS 
3. Insight words:  
Personal Diary: 
r=.38(p<.001) 
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Currently depressed individuals 
used more "I" than never 
depressed group (d=0.58, p<.02) 
No "me" or "my" differences 
between currently depressed and 
never depressed groups 
No differences between 
Currently depressed 
individuals used more 
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person singular words than non-
suicidal poets (p=0.02, effect 
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Note. The items above represent the most commonly occurring words in the texts used to generate the 
WRAD, along with the weights that were assigned to them based on their occurrence in texts that were 
scored for RA by human raters. Scores range from -1 to 1 with higher scores denoting words that are 







Chapter 3: Study 2 
Episodic Processing in Adults with Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Comorbid 
Depressive Disorders 
The capacity to mentally “travel through time” is considered uniquely human (e.g., 
Piolino et al., 2009; Tulving, 1985; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997).  Over 100 years ago, 
William James (1890/2010) described the present cognized moment as a “saddle-back, with a 
certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions 
into time” (volume I, p. 406). The recollection, or re-experiencing, of past experiences and the 
imagination, or pre-experiencing, of future episodes (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner, 2008) serve important functions for psychological health: they help maintain 
a coherent and continuous sense of self (e.g., Conway, 2005; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2012), they are tools for 
interpersonal connection (e.g., Alea & Bluck, 2003; Barclay, 1996), and they support problem-
solving and decision-making (e.g., Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
Several studies have also shown that people can recall positive autobiographical episodes (AEs) 
to reverse the effect of negative mood states (Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007; Josephson, 
Singer, & Salovey, 1996). 
When processing AEs, individuals integrate conceptual and episodic knowledge through 
the prism of their present affective state and active goals (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Conway et al., 2004; Singer & Conway, 2011). Ideally, retrieved AEs would accurately 
correspond to one’s lived experiences or realistic future and provide a coherent sense of self 
(Conway et al., 2004), which binds views of self-in-past and self-in-future (Markus & Nurius, 







retrieve over-general episodes (e.g., Williams et al., 2007), ineffectively process their emotional 
experiences (e.g., Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004) or generate faulty interpretations both 
about their selves (e.g., self-criticism; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012a; Blatt, 1995) and/or 
about their realistic ability to achieve desired goals (Bluck, 2003; Mennin & Fresco, 2013a).    
Ineffective episodic processing can be seen as “transdiagnostic” as it occurs in a wide 
range of Axis I disorders (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011; McKay et al., in press; Singer et al., 
2013). However, some disorders appear to be associated with greater episodic processing 
impairments. For example, a wealth of studies has consistently showed that depressed 
individuals report non-specific, contextually impoverished episodes (for reviews, see: King et al., 
2010; van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004; Williams et al., 2007), that they have difficulties 
imagining positive personal events (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007), and that they 
ineffectively generate meaning from significant personal memories (Harkness, 2011; Fischer-
Kern et al., 2013). In contrast, researchers have been mainly unable to identify anxiety-related 
impairments in episodic processing, including in individuals clinically diagnosed with 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Burke & Mathews, 1992; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; McKay 
et al., in press; Williams et al., 2007), a disorder that remains poorly diagnosed and treated 
(Borkovec & Ruscio, 2001; Mennin & Fresco, 2013b; Wittchen, 2002). However, since GAD 
patients present with significant difficulties in two of the functions of episodic processing: 
interpersonal relationships (Borkovec, Newman, Pincus, & Lytle, 2002; Crits-Christoph, 
Gibbons, Schamberger, & Gallop, 2005; Erickson & Newman, 2007) and goal-driven behavior 
(e.g., Fresco, Mennin, Moore, Heimberg, & Hambrick, 2014; Mennin & Fresco, 2013b), it is 







main goal of this study was thus to exhaustively examine episodic processing in individuals with 
GAD in an effort to identify anxiety-related impairments.  
Dimensions of Effective Episodic Processing: Specificity and Meaning-making 
In line with Conway’s (2005) emphasis on correspondence and coherence, most episodic 
processing studies examined two main capacities: (a) the capacity to generate specific, imagistic 
detailed episodes (e.g., Williams et al., 2007), and (b) the capacity to generate meaning from 
these episodes (Singer et al., 2013). However, these capacities have mainly been analyzed 
separately (Dimaggio, Salvatore, Popolo, & Lysaker, 2012). 
Specificity. At the lowest level of the hierarchy of autobiographical knowledge, Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) referred to event specific knowledge (ESK) which includes concrete, 
sensory-perceptual details of a personal episode. An influential early study found that suicidal 
patients provided categorical descriptions of events (e.g., “When I was at school”; Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986, p. 144) in response to both positive and negative cue words. Since then, 
overgeneral memory has been linked to impaired problem-solving (Raes et al., 2006) and 
delayed recuperation from depressive episodes (Dalgleish et al., 2007) and has been observed in 
a wide range of mood disordered populations (Williams et al., 2007).  
The original operationalization of episodic specificity required only that an episode take 
place in a specific location and over a timespan of less than 24 hours (Williams & Broadbent, 
1986). A more recent operationalization of specificity, which more closely relates to Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) definition of ESK, also requires that the episode include the 
encoding context (e.g., Wheeler et al., 1997) and specific details that distinguish it from other 
events (e.g., Lemogne et al., 2005; Piolino et al., 2003). In this study, I utilized a closely related 







Freedman, 1978). Language high in RA is specific, clear, concrete, and imagistic (Bucci, 1992). 
Specificity refers to level of details provided in the narrative; clarity refers to the speaker’s intent 
in conveying information to the listener; concreteness refers to sensory or perceptual qualities of 
the verbalization; and imagery refers to the level of imagery or evocativeness.             
Meaning-making. In addition to the ability to generate specific AEs, effective episodic 
processing requires a capacity to connect these episodes to long-term mental representations of 
one’s self (i.e., meaning-making; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013; Singer et al., 2013). The 
generation of meaning from one’s AEs helps unify disparate experiences over time (Prebble et 
al., 2013), enhances self-awareness (e.g., Morin, 2006), increases one’s understanding of his or 
her mental states (e.g., Jurist, 2005, 2010), and increases the ability to infer and respond to 
mental states of others (Jurist, 2005, 2010; Mennin & Fresco, 2013a). Deficits in the capacity for 
autobiographical meaning-making have been associated with a wide range of psychological 
disorders (for a review see Katznelson, 2014), including borderline personality disorder (e.g., 
Levy, Clarkin, Yeomans, Scott, Wasserman, & Kernberg, 2006) and clinical depression (e.g., 
Fischer-Kern et al., 2013).  
 Empirical studies assessing autobiographical meaning-making varied in their 
operationalization of this process (e.g., Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 
2007). In this study, I utilized a heavily theorized and widely studied operationalization of 
meaning-making—reflective function (RF; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2003; Katznelson, 
2014) as a measure of autobiographical meaning-making. RF refers to the capacity to understand 
and interpret—implicitly and explicitly—one’s mental states (Katznelson, 2014). Originally, RF 
was coded (for coding rules see Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998) in transcripts of the 







interview whereby adults are asked to reflect on significant early autobiographical experiences 
with their primary caregivers (Van IJzendoorn, 1995). More recently, RF has also been assessed 
via self-report measures (e.g., Shaver, Belsky, & Brennan, 2000) and via automated text analysis 
(Fertuck, Mergenthaler, Target, Levy, & Clarkin, 2012).    
Mechanisms Underlying Impairments in Episodic Processing 
 Williams and colleagues (2007), in explaining the mechanisms underlying overgeneral 
memory, underscore three mechanisms: functional avoidance, capture and rumination and 
impaired executive control. Functional avoidance refers to the tendency to generate non-specific 
episodes in an effort to avoid the emotional pain associated with more specific episodes, and is 
negatively reinforced by the reduction in distress following the retrieval of an abstract statement 
such as “I’ve always been poor at maintaining relationships” (Williams et al., 1999, p. 301). 
Capture refers to the tendency for the retrieval process to become truncated due to rigid negative 
self-representations (e.g., Beck, 1979; Blatt, 1995). Capture errors are more likely to occur in 
individuals prone to rumination (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) who stop their search for specific 
episodes and instead focus their attention on the reasons for their negative experience (e.g., Why 
can’t I be happy?). Finally, executive control refers to the inability to inhibit irrelevant 
conceptual knowledge (e.g., faulty attention regulation; Mennin & Fresco, 2013a, 2013b).  
 A critical mechanism underlying difficulties in meaning-making is a lack of 
psychological distance from one’s inner experience (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross, Ayduk, & 
Mischel, 2005; Mennin & Fresco, 2013b). Cocking and Renninger (1993) consider psychological 
distance a prime vehicle for bridging the gap between one’s external world and one’s mental 
world. Empirical research has shown that adequate distance from one’s internal experience can 







negative emotional reactivity (Ayduk & Kross, 2010). In an experimental setting, psychological 
distance (also termed self-distanced reflection; Kross, Card, Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012) is 
elicited by asking a person to conjure up an event so that they see themselves in it from a 
distance (Kross et al., 2012). In contrast, a self-immersed perspective is elicited by asking 
individuals to experience an event as if they were reliving it. Notably, psychological distance is 
not indicative of cognitive or affective avoidance (Kross et al., 2012) and has been found to be 
negatively correlated with rumination (Ayduk & Kross, 2010). 
GAD and Comorbid Depressive Disorders 
  One of the main challenges in detecting impairments in episodic processing in individuals 
with GAD has been the high comorbidity rates of GAD with depressive disorders such as MDD 
and dysthymic disorder (Aldao et al., 2010a; Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, & & 
Walters, 2005; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). No study that I am aware of examined 
this process in individuals with GAD with and without comorbid depression. In turn, hypotheses 
about the ways depression and anxiety differentially impact episodic processing must be 
generated from the broader literature. 
 Mennin and Fresco (2013b), in their overview of a treatment for GAD and MDD, 
emotion regulation therapy (ERT; Mennin & Fresco, 2009), highlight several distinct and 
overlapping features of GAD and MDD. First, though individuals with both disorders engage in 
negative self-referential processing (NSRP; see also Northoff, 2007), individuals with GAD are 
more likely to utilize worry (Mennin & Fresco, 2013a), while individuals with MDD are more 
likely to utilize rumination (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) and self-criticism (e.g., Aldao & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012a; Blatt, 1995). Thus, it is likely that when asked to assign meaning to 







GAD-only. Second, since rigid negative self-representations are associated with MDD (e.g., 
Beck, 1979; Blatt, 1995), but not necessarily with GAD (Mennin & Fresco, 2013a), individuals 
with MDD may show difficulties processing positive AEs (Williams et al., 2007), while 
individuals with GAD may not. A third factor which has been shown to be more strongly related 
to MDD than to GAD is poor understanding of emotions (Mennin et al., 2007). Overlapping 
features of GAD and MDD include deficits in attention regulation and heightened subjective 
intensity when processing emotions (Mennin & Fresco, 2013b). 
 In contrast to the growing literature examining comorbidity of GAD and MDD (e.g., 
Mennin & Fresco, 2013b), few studies have examined the GAD-dysthymic disorder comorbidity, 
and some authors have questioned whether these disorders can even be differentiated (Rhebergen 
et al., 2013). Also, since direct comparisons between MDD and dysthymic disorder are rare 
(Klein, 2010), relatively little is known about the differences in cognitive processes between 
these disorders. However, since dysthymic disorder may have a more adverse impact on quality 
of life than non-chronic MDD, and is less amenable to psychological treatment (Cuijpers, van 
Straten, Schuurmans, van Oppen, Hollon, & Andersson, 2010), it is important to understand if 
and how its comorbidity with GAD is different than the MDD comorbidity. Due to the limited 
amount of previous research, I approached the MDD-dysthymic disorder distinction in an 
exploratory fashion.   
Methodological Limitations in the Literature       
One methodological limitation of previous studies examining autobiographical specificity 
is their over-reliance on the cue-word paradigm of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986). In this procedure, subjects are presented with positive and 







cases—future episode that comes to mind. However, this procedure does not control for the 
salience of the elicited memory/episode for the individual (Lemogne et al., 2005), since some 
cue words may be irrelevant to the individual’s personal concerns (Rottenberg, Joorman, 
Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005). In turn, it is possible that these studies did not tap into the 
motivational dysfunctions (Mennin & Fresco, 2013a, 2013b) present in individuals with GAD, 
who are geared towards warding off painful inner experience (Klenk et al., 2011), since they 
were able to discuss more benign episodes.  
An additional limitation of the AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) is that cue words did 
not control for the content of the reported episode (Griffith, Summer, Raes, Barnhofer, Debeer, 
& Hermans, 2012). For example, Williams and colleagues (2007) note that an individual may be 
asked to generate an episode to the seemingly positive cue word ‘summer’ and in turn recall a 
traumatic event that occurred over the summer. In turn, these studies have been inconclusive in 
determining whether deficits in specificity were more pronounced in response to positive or 
negative cues (King et al., 2010). 
 Finally, studies examining meaning-making utilizing RF scoring also had several 
limitations (Fertuck et al., 2012): they required time-intensive training of judges, a labor-
intensive process of RF scoring, and they were mainly used to score AAI transcripts (Main & 
Goldwyn, 1990). 
Overview of Current Study 
The current study examined episodic processing in individuals with GAD, with or 
without comorbid MDD and dysthymic disorder. Subjects were administered a modified 
Emotion Interviews (Rottenberg et al., 2005a) whereby they were instructed to describe the 







imagine in the future. Transcribed interviews were linguistically analyzed via automated text 
analysis in order to assess the capacity to generate specific episodes (via RA; Bucci, 1997) and 
the capacity to generate meaning (via RF; Katznelson, 2014). In addition, in an effort to identify 
mechanisms underlying impairments in episodic processing, two additional measures were 
added: (a) the extent of cognitive efforts at meaning making; and (b) psychological distance—
“the subjective experience that something is close or far from the self, here, and now” (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010, p. 441)—from the reported episodes. This measure was added since insufficient 
psychological distance may be indicative of ineffective meaning-making (e.g., Kross et al., 
2010).   
Based on the overgeneral memory literature (e.g., Williams et al., 2007), I predicted that 
adults with GAD with comorbid depression would show deficits in specificity, particularly in 
response to the happy prompt, but that adults with GAD-only would not. Based on the Emotion 
Dysregulation Model (Mennin et al., 2007) and on the RF literature (Katznelson, 2014), I 
predicted that adults with GAD with comorbid depression would show impaired meaning-
making when processing peak AEs (Mennin et al., 2007), but that adults with GAD-only would 
not. I did not make any a priori predictions regarding an interaction between depression status 
and prompt. Third, since depressed patients have been shown to ruminate about the sources of 
their problems (Aldao et al., 2010b; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), I predicted that—compared 
to healthy controls—adults with GAD and comorbid depression would evidence increased 
cognitive efforts at meaning-making (Northoff, 2007), but adults with GAD-only would not. 
Finally, I predicted that adults with GAD, regardless of depression status, would evidence 







As noted, I approached the distinction between MDD and dysthymic disorder in an exploratory 
way and did not make any a-priori predictions regarding differences between these conditions. 
Method 
Participants  
Eighty nine subjects were recruited from an urban community in the Northeast of the 
United States.  In order to qualify for the study they had to be between the ages of 21 and 65, 
fluent in English, not be college students, and have no history of heart conditions or diabetes.  
Exclusion criteria also included substance related problems, not including nicotine, and the use 
of medication impacting cardiac functioning due to the physiological component of other aspects 
of this study. The mean age of the participants (64% female) was 30.76 (SD=8.911, range=21-
61). A total of 65.2% identified as Caucasian, 11.2% as Asian American, 10.1% African 
American, 3.4% as Hispanic, 1.1% as Native American, and the rest did not specify their 
ethnicity.  In terms of diagnosis, 28 participants (31.5%) did not meet DSM criteria for a mood 
or anxiety disorder and constituted the healthy comparison group; 32 participants (36%) met 
criteria for GAD-only, 18 participants (20.2%) met criteria for GAD+MDD, and 11 participants 
(12.3%) met criteria for GAD+dys.  
Clinical assessment. Advanced clinical psychology graduate students and post-
baccalaureate research assistants administered the Structured Clinical Interview Diagnosis 
(SCID; First et al., 2002) to participants who met the above criteria.  Interviewers were trained 
rigorously over a 6-month period in diagnostic interviewing with the SCID. As part of their 
training, interviewers had to achieve reliability (with expert diagnosticians) in their diagnoses of 
patients in a departmental clinic or with individuals from the community. Reliability was 







Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; DiNardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994). The CSR is a 0-8 rating of 
the severity of symptoms and impairment associated with each diagnosis; scores of 4 or greater 
represent clinically significant symptom severity. For diagnoses to be considered present there 
must have been complete agreement in diagnosis and CSR (within one rating point) between the 
interviewer and an expert diagnostician (Ph.D.), who provided ratings following a dispositional 
case presentation. Initial agreement was high, with correlations between CSRs by interviewers 
and expert diagnostician ranging from .83 to .97. Discrepancies of more than 1 CSR point would 
be discussed in order to reach an agreement. In addition, 25% of interviews were coded for each 
diagnosis by a senior member of the lab, who watched a video recording of the interview (for 
GAD and depressive disorders, k’s from .89 to 1; for other disorders, k’s from .70 to .85).  
Procedure 
Self-report measures.  The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996) is a 21-item measure of depressive symptoms.  It covers various aspects of the 
depressive condition: cognitive, affective, behavioral, somatic, and motivation.  Each symptom is 
rated on a 4 point scale ranging from 0-3. The ratings are summed, yielding a score from 0-63. 
Internal consistency for this study was excellent (𝛼 = .908). 
The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GADQ-IV; Newman et al., 
2002) is a 9-item self-report measure that assesses symptoms of GAD as delineated in DSM-IV-
TR (APA, 2000).  Five items are dichotomous and measure the excessiveness and 
uncontrollability of worry, one item is open-ended and asks for a list of the most frequent worry 
topics, two items on a 9-point scale measure the clinical distress and functional impairment 
associated with excessive worry and anxiety, and a final item asks about the presence of the each 







from 0 to 13 (e.g., Newman et al., 2002).  The GADQ-IV has shown good concurrent validity, 
test-retest reliability, and the ability to differentiate individuals with clinical and non-clinical 
levels of GAD (e.g., Newman et al., 2002). 
Modified emotions interview. Research assistants administered a modified version of 
the Emotions Interview (Rottenberg et al., 2005b), a brief (approximately 10 minutes) semi-
structured interview designed to elicit details concerning the maximally happy and sad moments 
experienced by each participant in his or her lifetime.  In this study, each participant was 
additionally asked to describe the most anxiety provoking future situation that he or she could 
imagine. Interviews were videotaped and subjects were debriefed following the completion of 
the study. The protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of both Yale University 
and the City University of New York. 
Transcription.  Each interview was carefully transcribed from video files and prepared 
for automated text analysis. Initially, video files were converted into .wav audio files.  These 
files were then transcribed by undergraduate and post- baccalaureate research assistants using the 
CLAN (freeware) software (MacWhinney, 1991). Each vocal utterance was highlighted, and a 
time marker was inserted.  Transcriptions denoted changes in turn of speech (interviewer vs. 
interviewee), as well as segmentations for different interview condition (i.e., anxious, happy or 
sad).  Two additional research assistants reviewed each transcription to assure accuracy of 
transcription. 
Linguistic analysis. We utilized two computer programs to generate linguistic variables: 
(1) The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker et al., 2007) is a text analysis 
computer program which calculates the percentage of words in a certain category (e.g., articles, 







Maskit, 2014a, 2014b) is a text analysis computer program which calculates scores for different 
word categories, either as a percentage of total words (similar to the LIWC) or as frequency of 
appearance over time. When measuring frequency over time, linguistic variables (e.g., 
positive/negative words) are assessed to the extent which they appear per millisecond (Maskit, 
2014a). In this study, linguistic variables were calculated over time in an effort to increase 
ecological validity. By doing so, the automatic processing of language more closely resembles 
the way humans implicitly process spoken language, for example by taking into account speech 
rate and pauses.  
Linguistic measures. (1) Specificity. I used the Weighted Referential Activity Dictionary 
(WRAD; Bucci & Maskit, 2006) as a measure of specificity.  The WRAD is an empirically 
generated word list that coincides with lanuage that was rated as high in RA (Bucci, 1997; Bucci 
& Kabasakalian-McKay, 1992).  Each word in the WRAD has a weighted score.  For example, 
the word “that” which is non-specific is scored low (-.875) while the article “the” which likely 
precedes a specific noun (e.g., “the tree”) has the maximal score of 1.(2)Meaning-making.  I 
used the Computerized Reflective Functioning Dictionary (CRF; Fertuck et al., 2012) as a 
measure of meaning-making. The CRF is a dictionary of words that are associated with language 
that is high in Reflective Functioning (RF; Fonagy et al., 2003; Katznelson, 2014). (3) I used the 
LIWC cognitive processes dictionary (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2009) as a measure of increased 
cognitive efforts at meaning-making. This dictionary includes words that were rated by human 
judges as related to cognitive processes and include words such as ‘because’, ‘should’, and 
‘maybe.’ (4) Psychological Distance.  I used a composite score derived via a large factor 
analytic study (Pennebaker & King, 1999) which denotes psychologically distant language. It 







verbs, and few discrepancy words. I used the following formula to calculate this score 
(Pennebaker, personal communication): PD = 0.765 * Z_article + 0.683 * Z_Sixltr - 0.823 * Z_i 
- 0.593 * Z_present - 0.4855 * Z_discrep. (5) Affective Tone. I used a weighted valence 
dictionary (Murphy, 2014) based on ratings from the Affective Norms for English Words 
(ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999) as a manipulation check to determine whether participants used 
more negatively-valenced language to discuss anxious and sad episodes than happy episodes.  
The initial ANEW ratings included scores from 1-9 on three dimensions: arousal, pleasure and 
dominance.  For example, the word “relaxed” was assigned a high valence score (6.40) and a low 
arousal score while “frustrated” was assigned a low valence score (2.70) and a relatively high 
arousal score (5.55).  In this study, I converted the valence and arousal scores to scores between 
0-1 to allow for usage in the DAAP software.    
Analytic Plan  
 The experimental design consisted of a mixed-effects MANOVA with one within-subject 
factor (Prompt: Anxious, Happy, Sad) and one between-subject factor (Diagnostic Group: 
Healthy Control, GAD, GAD+MDD, GAD+dys), with dummy codes for each of the 
psychopathology groups, in order to directly compare each psychopathology group with healthy 
controls. I then examined the main effects and interactions of prompt and diagnostic group by 
running similar mixed-effects ANOVAs for each of the dependent variables of interest: 
specificity (RA), meaning-making (RF), cognitive efforts at meaning-making and psychological 
distance. 
Results 







Mean and standard deviations of demographic and clinical characteristics are presented in 
Table 1. There were no differences between the four diagnostic groups in gender, age and 
ethnicity (all p’s>0.13).  I compared the groups in terms of self-reported depression and anxiety 
and—consistent with expectations—found significant differences for both measures.  As 
expected, both depression groups had significantly higher BDI-II scores than the GAD-only 
group (p’s<.05) and the control group (p’s<.0001). Similarly, all of the GAD groups had higher 
GAD-Q scores than the control group (all p’s<.0001). 
Manipulation Check. 
 I examined the affective valence of the reported autobiographical episodes and found a 
significant main effect for prompt, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F(1.872, 164.717) = 59.061, 
p<.001, 𝜂2 = .402. As expected, participants used more positively-valenced words when 
discussing happy episodes (M=.514, SD=.007) than when discussing sad episodes (M=.503, 
SD=.007) or anxious episodes (M=.503, SD=.007). Between-prompt differences remained 
significant after Bonferroni corrections, p’s<.001.  Intercorrelations and multivariate analysis. 
 Correlations between the WRAD, CRF, LIWC cognitive processes, and psychological 
distance, and self-report measures of depression (BDI-II) and anxiety (GAD-Q) are presented in 
Table 2. Examination of the bivariate correlations indicates a significant negative correlation 
between psychological distance and LIWC cognitive processes, as well as the BDI-II and the 
GAD-Q. Further, WRAD scores were positively correlated with CRF scores. Finally, LIWC 
cognitive processes scores were positively correlated with BDI-II scores. 
The 4 (diagnostic group: GAD-only, GAD+MDD, GAD+dys, Controls) by 3 (prompt: 
anxious, happy, sad) mixed-effect MANOVA using WRAD, CRF, LIWC cognitive processes 







GAD+MDD and prompt, F(8, 74) = 2.373, Pillai’s trace = .196, p = .024, a significant main 
effect for GAD+MDD, F(4, 82) = 2.711, Pillai’s trace = .117, p = .036, and a main effect for 
prompt, F(8,78) = 43.592, Pillai’s trace = .817, p< .001. None of the other main effects or 
interactions reached significance (p’s>.18). 
Specificity. 
 In line with hypotheses, participants in the GAD-only group did not differ in their 
WRAD scores from healthy controls, p = .79 (see Figure 1).  The predictions for the comorbid 
depressive groups were only partly confirmed: participants in the GAD+dys group had lower 
WRAD scores than healthy controls, F(1,85)=4.441, p=.038, 𝜂2 = .05 but participants in the 
GAD+MDD group did not, p=.974. I also found an unexpected effect of prompt, 
F(2,170)=14.024, p<.001, 𝜂2 = .142, whereby the descriptions for the anxious prompt had lower 
WRAD scores than those for the happy prompt, and the descriptions for the happy prompt had 
lower WRAD scores than those for the sad prompt (all p’s<.05 after Bonferroni corrections). 
Finally, the predicted interaction effect for the comorbid depressive conditions was also mainly 
confirmed: the interaction between prompt and GAD+MDD diagnosis was significant, 
F(2,170)=5.678, p=.004, 𝜂2 = .063,and the interaction between prompt and GAD+dys diagnosis 
showed a trend towards significance, F(2,170)=2.527, p=.083, 𝜂2 = .029. Follow up post hoc 
tests using Bonferroni corrections revealed that participants in the GAD+MDD group had lower 
WRAD scores than healthy controls in the happy prompt (p=.024), but not in the anxious 
(p=.866) or sad (p=.104) prompts, and that participants in the GAD+dys group also had lower 
WRAD scores than healthy controls in the happy prompt (p = .001), but not in the anxious (p = 








 In contrast to predictions, there was no significant main effect of diagnostic group for the 
CRF (Fertuck et al., 2012), my measure of effective meaning-making (all p’s>.1; see Figure 1).  
Once again, I did find an unpredicted effect of prompt F(2,170)=10.652, p<.001, 𝜂2 = 
.111,consisting of higher CRF scores in response to the sad prompt than in response to either the 
anxiety or happy prompts (p’s<.01). I also found an unpredicted interaction effect between 
prompt and the GAD+MDD diagnosis, F(2,170)=3.461, p=.034, 𝜂2 = .039. None of the other 
interactions were significant (p’s>.12). Follow up post hoc tests using Bonferroni corrections 
revealed that participants in the GAD+MDD group had lower CRF scores than healthy controls 
in response to the happy prompt (p=.012), but not in response to the anxious (p=.241) or sad 
(p=.437) prompts.  
Cognitive efforts at meaning-making.  
My predictions for the measure of efforts at meaning-making, the LIWC cognitive 
processes dictionary (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2009), were partially confirmed (see Figure 2): 
Participants in the GAD+MDD group used more cognitive process words than healthy controls 
across the entire interview, F(1,85)=7.921, p=.006, 𝜂2 = .085, but those in the GAD-only group 
(p=.152) and in the GAD+dys group (p=.207) did not.  I also found a main effect for prompt, 
F(2,170)=84.533, p<.01,𝜂2 = .499, with greater use of cognitive process words in the anxiety 
prompt than in the happy or sad prompts. Finally, I also found an interaction effect between 
prompt and the GAD+MDD diagnosis, F(2,170)=4.814, p=.009, 𝜂2 = .054. None of the other 
main effects or interactions were significant (p’s>.15). Follow up post hoc tests using Bonferroni 
corrections revealed that participants in the GAD+MDD group used more cognitive process 
words than healthy controls in the anxiety (p=.001) and happy prompts (p=.002) but not in the 








 As predicted, participants in the GAD-only group used language with less psychological 
distance than healthy controls, F(1,85)=.038), p=.038, 𝜂2 = .050. See Figure 2.  Similarly, 
participants in the GAD+MDD group used language with less psychological distance than 
healthy controls, F(1,85)=5.313, p=.024, 𝜂2 = .059. Participants in the GAD+dys group did not 
differ from healthy controls (p=.206). The main effect for prompt on psychological distance and 
the interactions between diagnostic groups and prompt on psychological distance were not 
statistically significant (p’s>.2). 
Discussion 
 The present study examined the ways in which episodic processing is impaired in adults 
with GAD, with or without comorbid depressive disorders. I aimed to clarify whether there exist 
anxiety-related impairments in episodic processing that have yet to be identified in the literature. 
Results suggest that adults with GAD-only are not impaired in their ability to generate specific 
contextual AEs or to ascribe meaning to them, but that they talk about these episodes in a highly 
involved way with insufficient psychological distance (Sigel, 1970). The results also shed some 
light on the ways in which adults with GAD and chronic, mild depression (i.e., dysthymic 
disorder) differ in their ways of processing AEs from adults with GAD with severe non-chronic 
depression (i.e., major depressive disorder).  
Consistent with expectations, certain impairments in episodic processing were found to 
be related to depression but not to anxiety. First, I found reduced specificity in both of the 
depressive groups compared to healthy controls but did not find reduced specificity in the GAD-
only group. I also found an unexpected difference between the two depressive groups. Whereas 
participants in the GAD+dys group showed reduced specificity across the entire interview, those 







Since previous studies focused on either MDD or nonclinical dysphoria (Williams et al., 2007), I 
can only tentatively speculate that adults with GAD and chronic low-level depression (i.e., 
GAD+dys) might have—over time—developed a context-insensitive (Rottenberg et al, 2005a) 
functional avoidance of specific emotional episodes (Williams et al., 1999), regardless of their 
valence.  In this respect, it would be particularly important for future studies to examine 
specificity deficits in different depressive disorders and in response to a wide range of 
personally-meaningful prompts.  
The MDD finding is mainly consistent with previous research showing greater 
impairments in specificity in depressed adults’ descriptions of positive episodes (Williams et al., 
2007). However, in contrast to previous work, I did not find evidence of specificity impairments 
in response to negative prompts.  Hence, this finding lends support to the capture hypothesis 
(Williams et al., 2007), which explains deficits in specificity as resulting from a “hijacking” of 
the retrieval process by negative abstract representations of self (e.g., Beck, 1979; Blatt, 1995). 
Alternatively, it is possible that these results speak to the unique nature of episodic processing in 
adults with comorbid GAD and MDD whereby these individuals are unable to prevent (Klenk et 
al., 2011) the flooding of negative internal imagery.   
 Similarly consistent with expectations and with previous work (e.g., Mennin et al., 2007), 
meaning-making was impaired in adults with GAD+MDD, but not in adults with GAD-only. 
Additionally, impairments in meaning-making were evident only in the happy condition, lending 
support to the notion that it is the inconsistency with currently-held views of self (Conway et al., 
2004) which interferes with effective meaning-making. The finding that meaning-making was 
greater in response to the sad condition regardless of psychiatric diagnosis is consistent with 







negative experiences (McLean et al., 2007), due to their potential for life lessons and insights 
about one’s self. 
 In terms of mechanisms underlying episodic dysfunction, I found—as expected—that 
adults with GAD+MDD utilized greater cognitive efforts at meaning-making (Northoff, 2007) 
than healthy controls when asked to discuss peak AEs but that adults with GAD-only did not. 
However, while it has long been suggested that depressed individuals ruminate about the causes 
of their negative feelings (e.g., Aldao et al., 2010b; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins, 
Moberly, & Moulds, 2011), this study’s results suggest that adults with GAD+MDD utilize 
greater cognitive efforts when discussing happy events than when discussing sad events. One 
explanation for this finding is that the threat to self-coherence (Conway et al., 2004), and not the 
negative content, leads to emotional distress which in turn leads to the need to dampen the 
emotional experience (Mennin & Fresco, 2013b). Alternatively, it is possible that for depressed 
individuals, processing happy AEs leads to self-criticism (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; 
Blatt, 1995). Future research is needed in order to better understand the mechanisms underlying 
this finding. 
 The main anxiety-related finding is that adults with GAD talk about peak AEs with less 
psychological distance than healthy controls. This finding is consistent with Roemer and 
Orsillo’s (2002) conceptualization of individuals with GAD as having little separation from their 
internal experiences, which some authors suggest may be a result of childhood experiences of 
enmeshed relationships with caregivers (Cassidy, Lichtenstein-Phelps, Sibrava, Thomas, & 
Borkovec, 2009). However, since it is widely accepted that adults with GAD reactively use 
strategies such as worry (Aldao et al., 2010b) to distract themselves from distressing emotional 







question whether in this study efforts at avoidance were unsuccessful, and if so—why.  One 
possible answer is that the explicit instruction to recall and discuss peak AEs led to a failure of 
avoidance. Alternatively, it is possible that the structured nature of the interview reduced 
uncertainty, thereby precluding the need to resort to worry and avoidance.  
 Unlike participants in the GAD-only and the GAD+MDD groups, those in the GAD+dys 
group did not differ from healthy controls in their psychological distance. This raises the 
possibility that this group processes AEs in a unique manner. Adding to this notion is the finding 
that dysthymic adults spoke about AEs in a less specific manner across the entire interview, and 
that they did not utilize greater cognitive efforts to generate meaning like adults with 
GAD+MDD. One possible explanation for this finding is that individuals with GAD and chronic 
depression, perhaps due to repeated failures to process AEs effectively (i.e., failure of promotion 
goals; Klenk et al., 2011), become disengaged and less likely to try and process AEs (i.e. 
hypoactivation of promotion system; Mennin & Fresco, 2013b). Although these findings need to 
be cautiously interpreted within the context of a relatively small sample of GAD+dys patients 
(n=11), if this pattern of episodic processing is confirmed in future studies, it may help guide 
therapeutic interventions.  For example, whereas it may be beneficial to help adults with GAD-
only or GAD with MDD to talk about AEs with more psychological distance, adults with GAD 
and dysthymic disorder may benefit from learning how to discuss peak AEs in a more vivid way.  
 Since this is the first study to explicitly examine psychological distance in the context of 
episodic processing, I can only tentatively speculate as to the possible connections between 
reduced psychological distance and its impact on the functions of episodic processing (Bluck, 
2003): maintenance of a coherent conceptual self (e.g., Prebble et al., 2013), facilitation of social 







Pillemer, 2003). First, since psychological distance is required in order to view one’s self as an 
object of inquiry that can be organized and made sense of (Sigel, 1968), in its reduced form, 
adults with GAD are less likely to utilize their AEs to support their accurate and flexible views 
of self. Also, if these individuals do not have a sense of agency over their inner experience, they 
may attribute their thoughts to an external source (Prebble et al., 2013), a common feature in 
GAD (i.e., uncontrollable worry). Second it is interesting to consider how talking about 
personally meaningful episodes using an involved linguistic style (i.e., the opposite of 
psychologically distant) impacts the listener and the ability to generate intimate connections 
(e.g., Alea & Bluck, 2007; Bluck & Alea, 2009). If indeed this style of narrating negatively 
impacts the social function of AEs, this may shed some light on the interpersonal difficulties 
reported in GAD (Borkovec et al., 2002). Finally, inadequate psychological distance from one’s 
experience may hinder the ability to observe, evaluate and reflect on AEs (Prebble et al., 2013) 
in order to accurately predict future events. Accordingly, the anticipation and fear of future 
catastrophic events is characteristic of individuals with GAD (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995).          
 Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, since the sample did not include a 
group of participants with only depressive disorders, I cannot be certain that reduced 
psychological distance is not also present in adults with MDD only. Second, since most episodic 
processing studies relied on human judges and not on computerized text analysis, the 
discriminant and construct validity of the linguistic measures ought to be verified in future 
empirical studies. And third, the design included two past-oriented prompts (i.e., happiest and 
saddest events) and one future-oriented prompt (i.e., anxiety-provoking event). Thus, I was 
unable to distinguish whether prompt-related findings were due to the prompt’s emotional 







 Notwithstanding the above limitations, this study is the first to exhaustively study 
episodic processing in adults clinically diagnosed with GAD and to identify an anxiety-related 
deficit: reduced psychological distance when discussing peak AEs. Future studies can further 
clarify whether adults with GAD can speak with greater psychological distance if explicitly 
instructed to do so. Also, while this study examined the ways in which adults with GAD process 
AEs in an experimental setting, future investigations can clarify whether in naturalistic settings 
these individuals process fewer AEs than healthy controls, as indicated by the avoidance theory 
of worry (Borkovec et al., 2004). Hopefully, this line of research can shed light on this important 
psychological process and help guide therapeutic interventions for GAD, allowing individuals 









Demographic and Clinical Characteristics 
      
  Control  GAD  GAD+MDD  GAD+dys 
    (n=28)   (n=32)   (n=17)   (n=11) 
         
Demographics         
% Female  60.7  68.8  66.7  54.5 
Age (years)  30.21 (9.05)  30.94 (9.93) 31.53 (6.84)  30.45 (9.34) 
Racial 
Distribution         
% White  75  65.6  55.6  54.5 
% Black  10.7  9.4  5.6  18.2 
% Asian  7.1  9.4  27.8  0 
% Hispanic  0  0  5.6  18.2 
% Native American 0  3.1  0  0 
% Other  3.6  12.5  0  9.1 
% 
Missing  3.6  0  5.6  0 
BDI-II Score  9.18 (7.52)a  14.43 (8.1)a  21.77 (11.01)b 23.73 (5.85)b 
GAD-Q Score   5.02 (3.08)a   8.48 (2.23)b   9.67 (1.77)b   9.52 (1.82)b 
Note. Different subscripts within rows indicate significant post hoc group differences at p<.05.  BDI-
II = Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck et al., 1996); GAD-Q=Generalized Anxiety Disorder 




















1 2a 2b 3 4 5
1. Specificity (WRAD) -- .346
** 0.022 -0.095 -0.139 -0.131
2a. Meaning-making (CRF) -- 0.008 0.080 -0.093 -0.136
2b. Attempts at meaning-making





















Figure 1. Specificity scores, as measured by the WRAD (Bucci & Maskit, 2006) (above) and 

















































Figure 2. Cognitive efforts at meaning-making, as measured by the LIWC cognitive processes 
dictionary (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2009) (above) and Psychological Distance (Pennebaker & 
King, 1999) (below). Psychological Distance scores are standardized and range from -1 to 1. 





















































Chapter 4: General Discussion 
The notion that the words one speaks provide a window into the way he or she thinks and 
organizes their world has a long history across a range of disciplines within the larger field of 
psychology (Wilson & Weinstein, 1992). In ‘Thought and Language’, Vygotsky (1962/2012) 
poetically described the relationship between word use and underlying thoughts:  
Thought is not expressed but completed in the word. We can, therefore, speak of 
the establishment (i.e., the unity of being and nonbeing) of thought in the word. 
Any thought strives to unify, to establish a relationship between one thing and 
another. Any thought has movement. It unfolds. It fulfills some function or 
resolves some task. This flow of thought is realized as an internal movement 
through several planes, as a transition from thought to word and word to thought. 
(cited in Wilson & Weinstein, 1992, p. 365)   
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to better understand how linguistic patterns 
are impacted by the presence of mood and anxiety disorders. Specifically, I aimed to examine 
word use in individuals with GAD and depressive disorders. To this end, I conducted two 
studies. Study 1 synthesized current empirical efforts to identify patterns of word use in 
individuals with depression and delineated a conceptual and methodological roadmap which 
could advance future research. Building on the insights from study 1, study 2 empirically 
assessed word use in individuals with GAD, with or without comorbid depressive disorders, as 
they spoke about peak autobiographical events in their lives: the happiest event in their life, the 
saddest event in their life and the most anxiety-provoking situation they could imagine. Below I 
discuss the conceptual, methodological and treatment implications from these two studies, as 







Conceptual Implications     
Depression. Despite a wealth of psycholinguistic studies in the past two decades, Pennebaker 
and King’s (1999) assertion that “the psychological meaning of language use remains somewhat 
ambiguous” (p. 1309) appears to still be relevant today. Study 1 showed that most of the 
linguistic studies of individuals with depression examined word categories that were either not 
specifically related to depression (e.g., first-person pronouns) or left conceptually vague (e.g., 
cognitive words and negatively-valenced words). In turn, it had been difficult to ascertain the 
effect that depression has on one’s speech.  
In order to advance theoretically-driven investigations, several strategies were proposed 
in study 1. The first proposed strategy was to examine whether depressed individuals’ language 
is abstract and non-specific, as implicated by the overgeneral memory literature (e.g., Williams 
et al., 2007). In a way, this line of research is consistent with early accounts of depressed 
individuals’ language being vague and abstract (Beck et al., 1962; Bucci & Freedman, 1982; 
Schaefer, 1948). Study 2 provided some empirical support for this assumption. Adults with 
comorbid GAD and MDD used language with lower RA (Bucci, 1997; Bucci & Freedman, 
1978)—a linguistic measure of specificity—than healthy controls, though only when discussing 
their happiest events. Additionally, adults with comorbid GAD and dysthymic disorder used less 
specific language across the three emotional conditions (anxious, happy, and sad). These results 
suggest that while it is fruitful to examine specificity in depressed individuals’ language, other 
factors ought to be considered. First, results from study 2 suggest that the nature of the 
depression (e.g., chronic vs. non-chronic) may impact one’s word use. For example, individuals 
with chronic depression may have a more globalized tendency to use non-specific language. 







study 2 were not predicted, future research is needed to more clearly identify the nature of these 
differences.  
Future research may also clarify whether other aspects of depression, such as Blatt’s 
(Blatt & Luyten, 2009; Luyten & Blatt, 2013) distinction between depression that is focused on 
issues of self-definition compared to depression that is focused on issues of relatedness, also 
impact one’s language use. Indeed, Fertuck and colleagues (2004) showed that severely 
depressed patients with greater deficits in relatedness (i.e., anaclitic; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) 
improved clinically as their language became less evocative (i.e., lower RA), while depressed 
individuals with greater deficits in self-definition (i.e., introjective) improved clinically as their 
language became more evocative.     
Another factor which ought to be more carefully defined and examined, is the context 
(Aldao, 2013; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012b) under which language is elicited and 
examined. Results from study 2 suggest that when asked to talk about happy topics that are 
incongruent with their views of self (Conway et al., 2004), individuals with MDD show marked 
impairments in their ability to use specific language, but that they were just as specific as healthy 
controls when asked to describe sad events. Similarly, Rodriguez and colleagues (2010) found 
different associations with depression between texts in online blogs and personal diaries. Other 
aspects of the context of language use such as the interpersonal nature (Aldao, 2013) of the 
situation (e.g., interview, phone, individual recording) may also help clarify the conditions under 
which depressed individuals’ language becomes vague and non-specific.  
In addition to language that lacks specificity, study 2 also provided support for the notion 
that adults with depression, and particularly adults with MDD, over-utilize cognitive efforts to 







regulation strategy rumination (Aldao et al., 2010b; Mennin & Fresco, 2013b). These results are 
consistent with—and help provide a conceptual framework for—similar findings presented in 
study 1. Interestingly, increased use of cognitive efforts at meaning-making were found in happy 
and anxious descriptions, but not in sad descriptions. This finding lends further support to the 
notion that threat to self-coherence elicits a need to reduce dissonance and utilize emotion 
regulation strategies (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004).  
One limitation of this dissertation that ought to be considered when interpreting the above 
results is that study 2 lacked a “pure” depression group since all of the depressed participants 
were also diagnosed with GAD. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether some of these results 
may be due to the comorbidity between GAD and depression. Future studies are needed to test 
the above findings in individuals with depression-only. 
GAD.  As noted in the introduction, research into the nature of language use in individuals with 
anxiety disorders has been sparse, and very few anxiety-related linguistic hypotheses have been 
tested. Study 2 provided an in-depth examination of language use in individuals clinically 
diagnosed with GAD, with or without comorbid depressive disorders. As expected, results 
showed that certain aspects of language, such as specificity (as measured by a computerized 
measure of RA; Bucci, 1997) and meaning-making (as measured by a computerized measure of 
RF; Fertuck et al., 2012), are not impacted by GAD without comorbid depression. Results also 
showed that a certain aspect of language, the ability to talk about personal experiences with 
adequate psychological distance (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Pennebaker & King, 1999) is 
impaired in individuals with GAD regardless of their depression status. This finding is consistent 
with similar linguistic findings in individuals with attachment anxiety (Borelli et al., 2011; Lee et 







AEs, future research is needed in order to determine whether this aspect of language is also 
characteristic of individuals with GAD when they speak about more benign topics. 
 The finding that individuals with GAD speak about AEs with insufficient psychological 
distance raises several questions. First, since this aspect of language appears automatic, will 
individuals with GAD be able to talk with greater psychological distance if specifically 
instructed to do so? And if they are able to do so—what impact will this have on their subjective 
experience? Previous research has shown that individuals with GAD, as opposed to healthy 
controls, become more distressed when implementing verbal emotion regulation strategies 
(Aldao & Mennin, 2012). In contrast, Kross and colleagues (2012) have shown that 
psychological distance can improve meaning-making and reduce emotional reactivity (Ayduk & 
Kross, 2010).  
Finally, it is unclear what function is served by talking about emotional episodes in such 
an immediate manner. One possibility is that this way of talking serves an avoidant function 
(similar to the function of worry; Borkovec et al., 2004) and helps the anxious individual ward 
off painful experience. Alternatively, it is possible that this way of talking about emotional 
experiences is aimed at reducing psychological distress, similar to the way an anxious-
ambivalent child tries to get closer and closer to his mother in an insistent yet ineffective effort to 
seek comfort. Some of these questions may be assessed in the context of emotion regulation 
therapy (ERT; Mennin & Fresco, 2009, 2013a) studies, a treatment for GAD which explicitly 
targets the ability to enhance psychological distance.       
Methodological Implications 
 In synthesizing previous efforts at identifying linguistic characteristics of individuals with 







these limitations stemmed from an over-reliance on the LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2007), its 
limited features, and its predefined content-based categories. While the LIWC’s word categories, 
which were defined by experts, clearly have content validity, their construct validity may be 
limited (Bantum & Owen, 2009). Study 2 showed that it is possible, and preferable, to pick and 
choose word categories which were theoretically constructed and empirically validated. The 
clearest example for such a category is the WRAD (Bucci & Maskit, 2006) which was 
inductively constructed to tap into the ability to translate inner experience into verbal form—
referential activity (RA; Bucci & Freedman, 1978). Beyond its clear theoretical correlate, the 
WRAD also utilizes weights, thereby allowing a more nuanced detection of levels of RA in a 
text. Within the context of this dissertation, the WRAD appears to be particularly useful in 
assessing specificity in the broad sense of the word, as defined by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 
(2000). However, since only one prior study used the WRAD to assess episodic specificity 
(Maskit & Bucci, 2012), future studies are needed to determine how the WRAD differs from 
previous measures of specificity (Williams & Broadbent, 1986).    
 Study 2 also showed that the underutilized psychological distance factor (Pennebaker & 
King, 1999) can be used to tap into a meaningful psychological construct which is relevant to the 
study of anxious individuals’ speech. This factor, which was shown to be consistent across time 
and situations (Pennebaker & King, 1999), and was also found in a separate large scale factor-
analysis (Biber, 1988), was successfully used in study 2 to identify group differences between 
healthy controls and individuals with GAD. This dissertation also provided an operational 
definition for how to calculate this factor, something which was missing from previous 







 A third word category that appears to have utility for future investigations of depressed 
individuals’ language is the LIWC cognitive processes dictionary, which may be used to detect 
exaggerated cognitive efforts at meaning-making. Similar findings have been reported in a study 
that used a subset of the cognitive processes dictionary—causal words—as indicative of 
rumination (Grisham et al., 2011). Taken together, future research would benefit from more 
clearly identifying the subset of words that tend to accompany maladaptive rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008) and to discriminate between them and words that accompany more 
adaptive forms of reflection. 
 With regards to words that accompany reflection, study 2 utilized the CRF (Fertuck et al., 
2012) as a measure of effective autobiographical meaning-making. To my knowledge this is the 
first time that this dictionary is used outside the AAI paradigm (Main & Goldwyn, 1990). Hence, 
future research is needed to determine whether the CRF can indeed be used as a measure of 
effective autobiographical meaning-making. Additionally, just as the WRAD (Bucci & Maskit, 
2006) was developed as a more nuanced weighted version of the computerized referential 
activity (CRA; Mergenthaler & Bucci, 1999), a weighted dictionary may help provide a more 
nuanced measurement of RF and effective autobiographical meaning-making. 
 Finally, study 2 provided some support for the effective use of the more advanced 
features of the DAAP (2014a, 2014b). First, the DAAP enabled me to use weighted dictionaries 
such as the WRAD (Bucci & Maskit, 2006) and the weighted affect dictionary (Murphy, 2014). 
Additionally, study 2 also utilized time as an independent variable, which presumably enhanced 
ecological validity since this way of analyzing language more closely resembles the way humans 







account the presence of silences, an aspect of language which had been hypothesized as 
characterizing depressed individuals’ speech (Beck, 1967). 
 One methodological limitation of this dissertation is its reliance on the diagnostic 
categories of the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychological Association, 2000).  Though these 
categories have been used in both research and clinical practice for many decades, researchers 
have called into question their ability to clarify mechanisms of psychopathology (Sanislow et al., 
2010). Currently, NIMH is encouraging research efforts based on a framework emphasizing “the 
integration of knowledge about genes, cells, and neural circuits with knowledge about cognition, 
emotion, and behavior” (Insel, 2014; Sanislow et al., 2010, p. 634). Accordingly, future research 
can determine whether and how the linguistic findings reported in this dissertation fit into the 
new models of psychopathology.   
Treatment Implications 
 Though this dissertation did not directly assess the treatment of GAD or depression, its 
findings point to possible avenues that may enhance treatment efficacy. First, study 2 showed 
that individuals with GAD talk about peak AEs with insufficient psychological distance. Though 
further research is needed in order to better understand the implications of this deficit, it is likely 
that GAD patients experience these peak AEs as “too real”, similar to what Fonagy and 
colleagues (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006; Fonagy et al., 2003) termed “psychic equivalence” and 
what Hayes and his colleagues (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) termed “cognitive fusion”. 
Consequently, treatments for GAD may benefit from explicitly targeting the ability to talk about 
salient AEs with adequate psychological distance. This can be achieved in various ways, 
including through interventions aimed at enhancing the capacity for mentalization (e.g., Fonagy 







and through other mindfulness practices aimed at creating “healthy distance” from the product of 
one’s mind (Mennin & Fresco, 2013b). 
 Findings from study 2 further suggest that individuals with GAD and comorbid MDD 
also present with significant impairments in their abilities to discuss happy AEs: they talk about 
these episodes with reduced specificity, are less able to generate meaning, and over-utilize 
cognitive efforts to generate meaning. Thus, these patients may benefit from intervention aimed 
at slowly enabling them to recall or imagine specific happy episodes and to integrate them into 
their views of self. Indeed, research has shown that a therapeutic approach that encourages 
depressed patients to generate and reflect on AEs is effective in reducing depressive symptoms 
(life review therapy; Serrano, Latorre, Gatz, & Montanes, 2004). However, no research that I am 
aware of has examined the impact of interventions specifically targeting the generation of 
positive episodes. 
 Finally, findings from study 2 suggest that individuals with GAD and comorbid 
dysthymic disorder may present with different impairments than those with GAD and MDD: 
they show reduced specificity across a wide range of emotional topics, but do not talk with 
reduced psychological distance and do not over-use cognitive efforts to generate meaning. Thus, 
it is possible that these individuals are less characterized by distress and instead have a “bland” 
cognitive-emotional style which may indicate drained motivation (Dillon et al., 2014) to work 
hard in order to enjoy “mental time travel”. Consequently, it is possible that the therapeutic goal 
with these individuals ought to focus on helping them become more engaged with their AEs in 
an effort to reduce emotional avoidance (Borkover et al., 2004). 







 This dissertation provided a multi-method examination of the ways linguistic style is 
impacted by the presence of GAD and depression. As expected, different aspects of word use 
were found to be impacted by GAD and depression. When talking about peak autobiographical 
episodes, GAD patients, regardless of depression status, showed reduced psychological distance 
from their inner experience. Other aspects of language were found to be impaired in individuals 
with GAD+MDD, namely the capacity to use specific language and effectively generate meaning 
when discussing salient happy episodes. Additionally, individuals with GAD+MDD used more 
cognitive efforts to generate meaning than healthy controls. An unexpected finding from study 2 
was that individuals with GAD and comorbid dysthymic disorder showed a unique pattern of 
word use which appears to be indicative of a “bland” cognitive-emotional style. 
 In addition to the reported empirical findings, this dissertation also provided a new 
conceptual and methodological organization for future linguistic studies of individuals with 
anxiety and depression. Hopefully, the framework provided in this dissertation can lead to more 
nuanced and theoretically-driven investigations which can help clarify the distinct and 
overlapping linguistic features in these debilitating, difficult to treat, disorders.        
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